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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES LEWIS KIMBALL, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
MERAE KIMBALL, 
Respondent, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
FINDINGS OF FACT and 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 024901659 DA 
Judge Joseph C. Fratto, Jr. 
Commissioner Susan C. Bradford 
The above entitled matter came on for trial before the Honorable Joseph C. Fratto, Jr., 
District Court Judge, sitting without a jury, on November 30, 2004, December 2nd, 3rd, 6th, 7th, 8th, 
10th and 14th, 2004, and April 13th, 14th and 15th, 2005. Respondent was present represented by 
her attorney of record, Thomas R. Blonquist, and the Petitioner was present with his attorney of 
record, Wendy J. Lems. The guardian ad litem did not participate in the trial because custody 
matters were not at issue. After hearing the testimony presented by the parties, reviewing the 
exhibits that were received in evidence and considering the statements and arguments of counsel 
and memoranda submitted and otherwise being folly advised in the premises and good cause 
appearing therefor, the Court now makes and enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The parties were married each to the other on February 11, 1987. 
2. Petitioner filed a complaint for divorce on March 18, 2002. 
3. The parties' marriage was dissolved by a decree of divorce dated August 7, 2003, 
reserving for trial the custody and financial issues. 
4. The custody issues were resolved by stipulation approved by the Court and set forth in 
an order dated March 10, 2005, entitled Order Re: Custody and Related Matters. 
5. The bench trial involved issues related to Petitioner's claims for one half of the 
Respondent's inheritance, enhancement of Respondent's inheritance, attorney's fees and other 
matters. 
6. On or about June 22, 1988, Respondent received 913 shares of Utah Bearing and 
Fabrication, Inc., a Utah corporation founded by her father, Frank Pardoe, the "Family Business" 
herein. >V / 
7. Respondent's father died on August 9, 1993, and under the terms of agreements 
between Respondent, her mother, her brothers and her sister, she received 1,005 shares of stock 
in the Family Business. 
2 
8. On or about March 24, 1995, after negotiations with the then management of the 
Family Business concluded, Respondent agreed to sell her 1,005 shares for $2,500,000. 
9. Respondent received a down payment of $500,000 during March of 1995, and a ten 
year trust deed note for $2,000,000 payable at the rate of $25,335.15 per month. 
10. Respondent received the monthly payments through the month of June 1997, and on 
July 1,1997, received $1,697,039.70, the balance owed to her under the trust deed note. 
11. It is reasonable that all funds received by the Respondent from the sale of her shares 
of the Family Business be characterized as an inheritance. 
12. Respondent's practice was to deposit the monthly payment in her individual account 
at Zions Bank, deducting a portion for her use. 
13. Respondent opened an account at Fidelity Investments, the "Fidelity Account" 
herein, on February 26, 1996, as an individual account, with Respondent's social security number 
as the only tax identification number. 
14. With a portion of the funds Respondent received from the sale of her stock in the 
Family Business, she purchased treasury bills, issued in her name only, which totaled $224,000. 
15. Every action on Respondent's part thereafter shows that her inheritance was her sole 
and separate property. 
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16. On occasion, in 1996 and 1997, the trust deed monthly payment was deposited in the 
parties' joint account and checks were subsequently written by Respondent to the Fidelity 
Account. 
17. A SeaRay boat was purchased in June of 1996 for $34,000. 
18. The entire purchase price was paid by the Respondent from funds in the Fidelity 
Account. 
19. When the boat was destroyed, the $30,000 insurance check was deposited in the 
Fidelity Account. 
20. The boat that was destroyed was replaced by the boat purchased in May of 2001 for 
$35,805.72, the "Replacement Boat" herein. 
21. The entire purchase price was paid by the Respondent from funds in the Fidelity 
Account. 
22. The parties invested at least $55,000 with Jay Rice, the "Jay Rice Account" herein, 
during the year 2000. 
23. The entire investment was paid by the Respondent from funds in the Fidelity 
Account. 
24. Substantially all funds were withdrawn from the Jay Rice Account by Petitioner. 
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25. Petitioner did not disclose to Respondent that he had taken substantially all funds out 
of the Jay Rice Account. 
26. During 2001, Petitioner told Mr. Rice that Respondent did not know that he had 
withdrawn funds from the Jay Rice Account and to stall discussing the account with her until he 
could borrow money to replace the funds. 
27 Petitioner did not replace the funds he withdrew from the Jay Rice Account 
28. A 1997 Suburban automobile was purchased in October of 1999 for $28,570.94. 
29. The entire purchase pricex>f the 1997 Suburban was paid by the Respondent from 
funds in the Fidelity Account. 
30. The parties were in an automobile accident that destroyed the said 1997 Suburban 
beyond repair. 
31. To replace said vehicle, the parties selected and agreed to purchase a used 1997 
Suburban for $26,300 from Larry H. Miller, Bountiful Chrysler Jeep, the "Replacement 
Suburban" herein. 
32. Petitioner told Respondent that the entire purchase price of the Replacement 
Suburban would be paid by insurance proceeds from the 1997 Suburban that had been destroyed. 
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33. Without Respondent's knowledge or consent, Petitioner forged her name on a 
$30,510.95 check drawn on the Fidelity Account and made payable to Larry H. Miller Bountiful 
to pay for the Replacement Suburban. 
34. Said check was returned by Fidelity Investments marked "signature does not match." 
35. The insurance proceeds did not cover the entire purchase price of the Replacement 
Suburban. 
36. In order to pay the balance on the Replacement Suburban after the insurance 
proceeds were applied, Petitioner applied for a loan from Zions Bank. 
37. Petitioner completed and signed a credit application on December 26, 2000, stating 
that he earned $60,000 per month. 
38. Petitioner did not inform Respondent that he borrowed $12,555.95 from Zions Bank 
to purchase the Replacement Suburban. 
39. Petitioner did not inform Respondent that he wrote checks payable to Zions Bank to 
make payments on the Replacement Suburban loan by forging Respondent's name on Fidelity 
Account checks. 
40. During September of 1997, the parties purchased a home on Lori Kay Drive, 
Holladay, Utah, the "Lori Kay Home" herein, and a vacant lot hereinafter referred to as the "Odd 
Piece of the Lori Kay Property", for $379,964.67. 
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41. The entire purchase price was paid by the Respondent from funds in the Fidelity 
Account. 
42. The Lori Kay Home was remodeled and the entire cost of remodeling was paid by the 
Respondent from funds in the Fidelity Account. 
43. The Lori Kay Home was sold in October of 1998 for $406,142.55 after real estate 
commissions and closing costs were paid. 
44. The Odd Piece of the Lori Kay Property was not sold and, at the time of trial, was 
held jointly by the parties. 
45. The net proceeds of the sale of the Lori Kay Home were deposited in the Fidelity 
Account and every action taken thereafter shows that the funds were the Respondent's sole and 
separate property. 
46. Petitioner made no objection that the funds received from the sale of the Lori Kay 
Home be placed back into the Fidelity Account nor did he make a claim on the said funds, in 
fact, he assented that it was the Respondent's funds that had purchased and remodeled the Lori 
Kay Home and that, when the Lori Kay Home was sold, Respondent was entitled to the proceeds. 
47. It is reasonable that the funds received from the sale of the Lori Kay Home, 
$406,142.55, be the Respondent's sole and separate property. 
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48. The Respondent intended that her inheritance be handled separately, not as a marital 
asset. 
49. Every act of the Respondent manifested her intent that her inheritance be handled 
separately. 
50. Respondent's inheritance was placed in a separate account accessible through the 
writing of checks by the Respondent only. 
51. Respondent's inherited funds were placed in the Fidelity Account that was in the 
Respondent's name at all times. 
52. Respondent's inherited funds were not commingled either tn the way they were used 
or by their deposit into joint accounts. 
53. Joint accounts were used as conduits for Respondent's inherited funds, not as 
repositories in which they became commingled. 
54. To the extent that Respondent's inherited funds remained in a joint account, they 
were commingled, but when they came out of the joint account they resumed their character as 
Respondent's inherited funds and as such they became the sole and separate property of the 
Respondent. 
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55. To the extent that Respondent's inherited funds were placed in joint accounts, such 
as the Jay Rice account, this was done as a convenience and did not have the legal, the factual or 
the intended legal affect of either commingling the funds or making them marital property. 
56. Petitioner did not enhance Respondent's inheritance. 
57. No act of the Petitioner increased the amount of shares of the Family Business that 
the Respondent received, caused Respondent's holdings in the Family Business to have a greater 
value Gr resulted in the Respondent receiving a greater price for her holdings. 
58. It is reasonable the Odd Piece of the Lori Kay Property, titled in the name of the 
Petitioner and the Respondent as joint tenants, remain marital property. 
59. It is reasonable that said Odd Piece of the Lori Kay Property be sold and the net 
proceeds equally divided between the Petitioner and the Respondent. 
60. Petitioner did not report any of the income earned in the Fidelity Account in his 
1998, 1999, 2000 or 2001 tax returns. 
61. Petitioner earned an adjusted gross income in the year 1998 of $2,391. 
62. Petitioner earned an adjusted gross income in the year 1999 of minus $61. 
63. Petitioner earned an adjusted gross income in the year 2000 of $600. 
64. Petitioner earned an adjusted gross income in the year 2001 of $1,624. 
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65. Petitioner misrepresented to Respondent his 1998, 1999, 2000, and 2001 income and 
failed to disclose collection actions and lawsuits filed against him. 
66. When the parties separated in February and March of 2002, the amount remaining in 
Respondent's Fidelity Account was $1,042,840.72. 
67. Respondent withdrew $1,000,000 from the Fidelity Account in April of 2002, and the 
balance was withdrawn in June of 2002. 
68. Respondent filed an individual tax return for 1998 and reported all earnings, 564,927, 
from the Fidelity Account. 
69. The Village Point Way home is held jointly by Petitioner and Respondent, and, at the 
time of trial, had a value of $205,000. 
70. Respondent paid the balance owing on the Village Point Way home, $86,128.24, on 
June 6, 1995, from her inheritance. 
71. It is reasonable that Petitioner be granted a $102,500 equitable lien in the Village 
Point Way home to be received by him when the youngest child reaches eighteen years of age or 
graduates from high school, whichever occurs last. 
72. Petitioner, without authorization, forged Respondent's name on Fidelity Account 
checks totaling $142,467 made payable to himself or cash that he converted to cash. 
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73. Petitioner did not inform Respondent what he did with the $142,467 nor did he give 
her an accounting of his use of said funds, other than to state in court that the cash he received 
was used for family purposes. 
74. Petitioner did not substantiate his testimony by producing receipts, cancelled checks 
or other documentation. 
75. Petitioner, without authorization, altered 6 checks given to him by the Respondent by 
increasing them from $ 1,000 to $4,000. 
76. The alterations reduced Respondent's balance in the Fidelity Account $18,000 more 
than Respondent intended when she wrote the checks and gave them to the Petitioner. 
77. Petitioner has not given Respondent an accounting of his use of the said $18,000. 
78. It is reasonable that the money so obtained by the Petitioner was used for family 
purposes for the benefit of all members of the family, including the Petitioner. 
79. Petitioner presently earns $2,900 per month. 
80. Respondent graduated from the University of Utah with a Bachelor of Science degree 
in Elementary Education. 
81. It is reasonable that Respondent be imputed income of $2,900 per month. 
82. It is reasonable that the Petitioner pay the Respondent child support based upon the 
fact that he has physical custody of one child, Brooke, and that said child's primary residence is 
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Petitioner's residence and earnings of $2,900 per month and Respondent has physical custody of 
three children, Amanda, Ryker and Daniel, and said childrens' residence is Respondent's 
residence and has imputed income of $2,900 per month, in the amount of $408 per month to be 
paid, according to the split custody worksheet attached hereto as Exhibit A, until the youngest 
child reaches eighteen years of age or graduates from high school, whichever occurs last, and that 
each party take the tax exemption for the child or children in his or her custody and primary 
residence as set forth at paragraph 2 of the Order Re: Custody and Related Matters entered in this 
cause on March 10, 2005. 
83. It is reasonable that Respondent not receive alimony from the Petitioner because she 
does not have a need and he does not have the ability to pay. 
84. It is reasonable that all personal property be awarded to the party who had possession 
of that property at the time of trial. 
85. It is reasonable that the Replacement Boat be sold and the net proceeds divided 
equally between the parties. 
86. There exists a debt for unpaid taxes for the years 2000, 2001 and 2002. 
87. It is reasonable that the Respondent be solely responsible for the debt owed for 
unpaid taxes based upon earnings received from the investment of funds she inherited. 
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88. During the course of this litigation, the Court appointed as Special Master, Lisa 
Reading, the custody evaluator, Dr. Matthew Davies, and the childrens' therapists, Jim Hottinger, 
CSW and Dr. Haydee Mas, and it is reasonable that they be paid equally by the parties hereto. 
89. In addition, it was ordered that the parties undergo psychological evaluations -
Petitioner to be evaluated by Dr. Phillip W. Esplin and the Respondent to be evaluated by Dr. 
Donald Strassberg. 
90. The fees charged by Court appointed experts were as follows: 
Lisa Reading, Esq. $7,000 
Matthew Davies, Ph.D. $11,355.57 
James Hottinger, Ph.D. $840 
Haydee Mas, Ph.D. $3,561 
Phillip W. Esplin, Ph.D. $3,300 
Donald Strassberg, Ph.D. $1,912.50 
91. The parties paid the following amounts: 
Respondent Petitioner 
Lisa Reading, Esq. $1,500 $3,500 
Matthew Davies, Ph.D. $8,192.32 $5,074.75 
James Hottinger, Ph.D. $840 $0 
13 
Haydee Mas, Ph.D. $2,065 $1,062 
Phillip W. Esplin, Ph.D. $3,300 $0 
Donald Strassberg, Ph.D. $1,912.50 $0 
Total $17,809.82 $9,636.75 
92. The Court appointed professionals have been paid in full except Lisa Reading, Esq 
who is owed $2,000. 
93. Based upon the disproportionate payments made by the parties to Court ordered 
professionals, it is reasonable that Petitioner pay the Respondent $5,086.53. 
94. It is reasonable that the Respondent pay the balance owed to Lisa Reading, Esq and 
that she hold the Petitioner harmless therefrom. 
95. It is reasonable that any balance owed at December 1, 2004, to others who provided 
services for the parties in connection with this litigation, be paid by the Respondent and that she 
be required to hold the Petitioner harmless therefrom. 
96. It appears that there will be additional costs incurred by the parental coordinator, Dr. 
Jill Sanders, and others and it is reasonable that the parties pay these expenses on an equal basis. 
97. It is reasonable that to the extent there is a debt owing for unpaid taxes, the party who 
owes the tax pay the debt and in the terms of joint debts, it is reasonable that if the debt is joint 
but for the benefit of one party, then the debt be paid by that party. 
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98. It is reasonable that the parties maintain health insurance for the use and benefit of 
the children, if available through their employment, with each party to pay one-half of medical 
expenses not covered by insurance. 
99. If health insurance for the parties and their children is not available through 
employment, it is reasonable that a policy of insurance be purchased with each party to pay one-
half of the monthly premium. 
100. It appears that the Respondent failed to provide information about the childrens' 
activities, removed the children from school, interfered with parent-time, changed the children's 
enrollment, interfered with phone calls and prevented visitation that should have occurred. 
101. Respondent knew of the order applicable to these matters, had the ability to comply 
and willfully and knowingly refused to do so. 
102. Consequently, it appears that Respondent is in contempt and because make-up 
visitation is not possible in this situation, it is reasonable that Respondent purge her contempt by 
paying Petitioner the sum of $3,500. 
103. Petitioner has not prevailed on the main issues of this case which were his claims 
for one-half of Respondent's inheritance and enhancement of Respondent's inheritance. 
104. The attorney's fees that were charged by the Petitioner's counsel were neither 
reasonable nor necessary and represent a situation where this matter got out of hand. 
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105. The fees connected with the child custody and related matters have been paid, 
consequently, there is no financial need to reimburse them. 
106. It is not reasonable for the Petitioner to be awarded fees and costs because they were 
neither reasonable nor necessary and because they were paid by others, specifically his parents. 
107. It appears that the Petitioner's parents helped him pay the fees, that the fees are 
already paid and that the Petitioner does not have to pay back those who helped him pay the fees. 
From the foregoing findings of fact, the Court now makes and enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. All funds received by Respondent from the sale of her shares of the Family Business 
should be characterized as an inheritance. 
2. At no time did Respondent's inherited funds lose their character or identity. 
3. Petitioner's claim for one-half of the funds received by the Respondent from the sale 
of her stock in the Family Business should be denied. 
4. Petitioner's claim that he should be awarded a portion of the Respondent's inheritance 
because, through his efforts, Respondent received an increased amount of shares of the Family 
Business and was paid more when she sold them, should be denied. 
5. Respondent should be awarded as her sole and separate property all funds that were in 
the Fidelity Account at the time of the parties' separation. 
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6. All funds in the Jay Rice Account at the time of the parties' separation should be 
awarded to the Respondent. 
7. The Odd Piece of the Lori Kay Property should be sold and the net proceeds of the 
sale divided equally between the parties. 
8. Petitioner should receive a $102,500, non-interest bearing, equitable lien on the home 
and real property located at 2087 Village Point Way, Sandy, Utah, payable when the youngest 
child reaches eighteen years of age or graduates from high school, whichever occurs last, or when 
the Respondent remarries or no longer utilizes said home and real property as her primary 
residence. 
9. Petitioner should not be punished in this proceeding for, without authorization, forging 
Respondent's name on Fidelity Account checks and altering the amount of checks written by the 
Respondent on the Fidelity Account. 
10. Respondent should be imputed income of $2,900 per month. 
11. Based upon Petitioner's present earnings of $2,900 per month and the Respondent's 
imputed income of $2,900 per month and based upon the fact that Petitioner has the physical 
custody and the primary residence of one child, Brooke, and the Respondent has the physical 
custody and the primary residence of three children, Amanda, Ryker and Daniel, Petitioner 
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should pay the Respondent $408 per month as child support until the youngest child reaches 
eighteen years of age or graduates from high school, whichever occurs last. 
12. Each party should take the tax exemption for the child or children in his or her 
custody and primary residence. 
13. The Respondent should not receive alimony from the Petitioner. 
14. All personal property should be awarded to the party who had possession thereof at 
the time of trial. 
15. The Replacement Boat should be sold and the net proceeds divided equally between 
the parties. 
16. Any debt for unpaid taxes for the years 2000, 2001 and 2002, should be paid by the 
Respondent and she should hold the Petitioner harmless from said debt. 
17. Respondent should be solely responsible for the debt owed for unpaid taxes based 
upon earnings received from the investments of the funds she inherited. 
18. Respondent should be ordered to pay the outstanding debt to Lisa Reading, Special 
Master, in the sum of $2,000 and hold the Petitioner harmless therefrom. 
19. Respondent should be awarded a judgment against the Petitioner in the sum of 
$5,086.53 based upon his failure to pay 50% of the fees of professionals appointed by the Court 
during the course of this litigation. 
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20. The Respondent should pay any balance owed at December 1, 2004, to those who 
provided services for the parties and their children in connection with this litigation and she 
should hold the Petitioner harmless therefrom. 
21. Any additional costs incurred by the parental coordinator, Dr. Jill Sanders, and 
others, should be paid by the parties on an equal basis. 
22. Any joint debts incurred by the parties during their marriage should be paid by the 
party who received the benefit of that debt. 
23. The parties should maintain health insurance for the use and benefit of their children, 
if available through their employment, with each party to pay one-half of the premium and 
medical expenses not covered by the insurance. 
24. In the event health insurance for the parties and their children is not available through 
employment, a policy of insurance should be purchased with each party to pay one-half of the 
monthly premium and medical expenses not covered by the insurance. 
25. The Respondent should be held in contempt of court for her failure to comply with 
orders of this Court and be allowed to purge said contempt by paying the Petitioner the sum of 
$3,500. 
19 
i ; / 
26. The Petitioner's claim for an award of attorney's fees and costs should be denied. 
DATED this A day of September, 2005 
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ADDENDUM "B 
Thomas R. Blonquist, (0369) 
Attorney for Respondent 
40 South Sixth East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Telephone: (801) 533-0525 
FILED DISTIUC1'COURT 
Third Judicial District 
SEP 2 0 2005 
SALT LAKE 
ENTERED IN REQISTBY 
' ' OEJUDGMENT.S 
DATE 
'^AGEO 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES LEWIS KIMBALL, • ) 
Petitioner, ) 
v. ) 
MERAE KIMBALL, ) 
Respondent. ) 
AMENDED DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. 024901659 DA 
Judge Joseph C. Fratto, Jr. 
Commissioner Susan C. Bradford 
Having heretofore made and entered its finding of facts and conclusions of law, now, in 
accordance therewith, and upon motion of the Respondent and good cause appearing therefor, it 
is 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. All funds received by the Respondent from the sale of her shares of the Family 
Business, as described in the findings of fact, are characterized as an inheritance. 
2. Petitioner is not entitled to any portion of the funds received by the Respondent from 
the sale of her shares of the Family Business. 
Amended Decree of Divorce @J 
JD17455703 
024901659 KIM BALL, J AMES LEWIS 
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3. Respondent is awarded as her sole and separate property all funds that were in the 
Fidelity Account, as described in the findings of fact, at the time of the parties' separation. 
4. All funds remaining in the Jay Rice Account, as described in the findings of fact, are 
awarded to the Respondent. 
5. The Odd Piece of Lori Kay Property, as identified in the findings of fact, at the time of 
the parties' separation, shall be sold and the net proceeds of the sale divided equally between the 
parties. 
6. Petitioner is hereby granted a $102,500, non-interest bearing, equitable lien on the 
home and real property located at 2087 East Village Point Way, Sandy, Utah, to be paid when the 
youngest child reaches eighteen years of age or graduates from high school, whichever occurs 
last, or when the Respondent remarries or no longer utilizes said home and real property as her 
primary residence. 
7. Petitioner shall not be punished in this proceeding for, without authorization, forging 
Respondent's name on Fidelity Account checks and altering the amount of checks written by the 
Respondent on the said Fidelity Account. 
8. Respondent is hereby imputed income of $2,900 per month. 
9. Petitioner is ordered to pay Respondent the sum of $408 per month as and for child 
support to continue until the youngest child reaches eighteen years of age or graduates from high 
school, whichever occurs last. 
2 
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10. Each party shall be allowed the tax exemption for the child or children in his or her 
custody and primary residence. 
11. The Respondent shall not receive alimony from the Petitioner. 
12. All personal property is hereby awarded to the party that has possession thereof at the 
time of trial. 
13. The Replacement Boat, as identified in the findings of fact, shall be sold and the net 
proceeds divided equally between the parties. 
14. Any debt for unpaid taxes for the years 2000, 2001 and 2002, shall be paid by the 
Respondent and she shall hold the Petitioner harmless therefrom. 
15. Respondent is solely responsible for any debt owed for unpaid taxes resulting from 
earnings received from the investment of funds she inherited. 
16. Respondent is ordered to pay the outstanding debt to Lisa Reading, Esq., in the sum 
of $2,000 and hold the Petitioner harmless therefrom. 
17. In addition to the debt owed to Lisa Reading, Esq., set forth above, the Respondent 
shall pay the balance owed at December 1, 2004, to any persons who provided services for the 
parties and their children in connection with this litigation and she shall hold the Petitioner 
harmless therefrom. 
18. Respondent is awarded judgment against the Petitioner in the sum of $5,086.53. 
3 
nsl 
19. Any additional costs incurred by the parental coordinator, Dr. Jill Sanders, and 
others, shall be paid by the parties on an equal basis. 
20. Any joint debts incurred by the parties during their marriage shall be paid by the 
party who received the benefit of said debt. 
21. The parties shall maintain health insurance for the use and benefit of their children, if 
available through their employment, with each party to pay one-half of the premium and medical 
expenses not covered by the insurance. 
22. In the event health insurance for the parties and their children is not available through 
employment, a policy of insurance shall be purchased with each party to pay one-half of the 
monthly premium and the medical expenses not covered by the said insurance. 
23. Respondent is hereby held in contempt of court for her failure to comply with orders 
of this Court and she is allowed to purge said contempt by paying the Petitioner the sum of 
$3,500. 
24. Petitioner is not entitled to receive compensation from the Respondent in the form of 
attorney's fees and costs. 
4 
25. Each party shall sign any and all documents required to complete the distribution, 
sale or transfer of property as ordered herein. 
DATED this it day of September, 2005. 
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1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 (Electronically recorded on May 24, 2005) 
3 THE COURT: We have on the matter of Kimball vs. 
4 Kimball. The purpose —appears to me everyone is here that 
5 needs to be here. The purpose for this hearing is for me to 
6 announce my decision on the issues presented by the trial that 
7 was conducted. 
8 The protocol for the hearing is that I'll tell you my 
9 ruling, give you some of the reasons I make my ruling, make 
10 some findings and so forth. I anticipate that probably have 
11 full findings. Things will have to be added, but my effort 
12 here is to tell you why I ruled as I'm ruling. 
13 Let's begin with the main issue that was presented by 
14 this trial. The characterization and award of the proceeds 
15 from the sale of the stock in the family business. I would 
16 note that in going through the record that there is an order 
17 of April 10th, 2003 in which the Court found that $340,000 was 
18 clearly inherited money; but that $460,000 — that is, the 
19 proceeds from the sale of the Lori Kay home — was in question. 
20 Now, I don't know that that established the law of the 
21 case. I have not taken it as such; but I do make that note 
22 that there is that order and that finding in that order. 
23 I'm going to award the respondent the remaining funds 
24 she now holds. These are the reasons. That is, she holds from 
25 Fidelity — from the Fidelity account, the Jay Rice account, if 
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any, and the sale of the Lori Kay property. 
These are the reasons. The funds initially were 
received as an inheritance. The respondent intended that they 
be handled separately. Every action manifested that intent; 
and the money was handled separately. 
It was placed in a separate account, accessible 
through checks, if you will, the writing of checks. Those 
remained in th-e respondent's name at all times. The funds 
were not comingled either in the way they were used or in its 
deposit into joint accounts. 
The joint accounts were used as conduits for these 
funds; not as repositories in which they became comingled. 
Which the law of comingling is that they lose their character 
and so forth. '• v x • • 
I suppose to the extent that they remained in the 
joint fund they might be characterized as comingled;' but they 
came out of that account. In coming out of that account, I 
assume their character is what they were for what they were; 
and that is inheritance proceeds that they're the sole and 
separate party of the respondent. 
To the extent that they were placed in joint accounts, 
the Jay Rice account, or — for example, or petitioner had the 
ability to withdraw -•- that is, Mr. Kimball had the ability to 
withdraw or to trade within the account, I find that this was 
done as a convenience; and did not have either the legal, the 
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1 factual or intended effect of characterizing the funds or 
2 accomplishing of the char — accomplishing the legal effect of 
3 either comingling or making them marital property. 
4 I find that the petitioner did not enhance this asset. 
5 The asset, of course, is the stock in the first instance and 
6 then the price of the stock and selling the stock in the second 
7 instance. His efforts 1 find were to at best encourage seeking 
8 brief replacement stock; but there is no evidence that his 
9 efforts directly resulted in a greater price being paid, or 
10 that the stock had a greater value because of his efforts. 
11 I find that the funds from the Lori Kay sale — that 
12 is, the $460,000 — is respondent's sole and separate property. 
13 These are my reasons. The funds used for the purchase, the 
14 remodeling of the property were the respondent's. It wasn't 
15 based in joint tenancy. 
16 If it had remained property — that is, (inaudible) 
17 Lori Kay, and had not been taken out, then indeed it would have 
18 been a marital asset, because it would then have properly been 
19 characterized as using an inheritance to purchase an asset — a 
20 marital asset. 
21 When it was sold the funds went back to the respondent 
22 and every action taken certainly thereafter is that the funds 
23 were hers. Petitioner made no objection that they be placed 
24 back into her account, made no claim on the funds; and in fact 
25 I it appears to me that he acceded to the fact that these were 
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her funds that had purchased and remodeled the property; and 
that on the sale she was entitled to the proceeds back. To the 
extent that the money was used to purchase property jointlyr 
the property so purchased is marital property. 
I find that the petitioner, without authorization, 
signed the respondent's name to checks; and he without 
authorization altered the amount on checks — on certain 
checks. I find from a preponderance of the evidence that 
the money so obtained was used for family purposes. 
The only evidence that appears to be in front of me, 
which was basically Mr. Kimball's testimony, is that those 
funds were used for family purposes, seemingly interpreted 
for the benefit of all the members of the family, including 
Mr. Kimball. 
I cannot draw — I cannot reasonably draw from the 
evidence the inference that the respondent wants me to draw 
from the amount of — the total amount that was obtained in 
this way, or in the way it was drawn. 
Consequently, the odd piece of Lori Kay property at — 
well, Irll call it "the odd piece," is what I called it — is 
to be sold, because that still remains as marital property; 
property purchased through the inheritance, but remaining as 
such, has to be sold; and the net proceeds equally divided. 
The marital property at Village Pointe, whose fair 
market value appears to be $205,000, is awarded to the 
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respondent. She is to assume, pay and hold whatever debt — 
I don't believe there is a debt on it, but whatever debt is 
on that property; and to pay the taxes and fees and so forth 
connected with that property. 
I award the petitioner an equitable lien for one-half 
of the $205,000, which is to be paid to him when the youngest 
child reaches 18 years of age or graduates from high school, 
whichever is last. 
Now, let me go back here one moment in terms of these 
unauthorized checks and the increasing the amount on checks. 
I decline the respondent's invitation to award all the equity 
in that home, the Village Pointe home, to her because of the 
plaintiff's — or the petitioner's altering of the checks. 
I see this as a penalty which you're asking me to 
impose; but if there had been evidence that I had seen to a 
preponderance that the money taken in this manner, used in 
this manner was used solely for his benefit, then I believe 
the penalty that you suggest, Mr. Blonquist, would have been 
appropriate. 
Because I do not — because I found otherwise in 
terms of the evidence that was presented in front of me, and 
I'm not drawing the inferences that you're suggesting from the 
evidence, I see this ther becoming really just a penalty for 
having altered checks and signed the respondent's name when he 
was not authorized to do that. 
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I don't believe in these proceedings that such a 
penalty would be appropriate. I think I need to identify the 
kind of property, how it was used and so forth, and make my 
division and awards accordingly, and avoid punishments for bad 
conduct. 
I find that both the petitioner and the respondent 
make $2,900 per month. The petitioner, I make this finding, as 
a matter of history. Although he has had a history of making 
more than $2,900 a month, and present earnings or at least at 
the time the evidence was presented. 
I make this finding in relation to the respondent as 
a matter of imputation. Temporary orders had a set income of 
$892 and $893, which is minimum wage; but the evidence I had in 
front of me was that — and really the only evidence on this 
point was that the respondent had in the past taught school. 
I believe it was elementary school; and her testimony was that 
in terms of what she was capable of earning, that it would be 
something less than $35,000 per year. So I've taken that 
amount, divided it by 12, and that's $2,900 a month. 
I find that each party has a need, if you will, for 
$3,200 a month. With those findings, I make these orders. The 
child support award is to take the number of the children and 
so forth in the appropriate worksheet, with $2,900 per month 
for each child — I mean, for each party; and as a mathematical 
computation and as a matter of the chart that would give you 
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1 the amount resulting from the mathematical computation, that 
2 will be the award of child support one to the other. 
3 I I'm not certain how that comes out, because you'll 
4 have to — at least in terms of current arrangements here, 
5 draw those worksheets. In any event, however it comes out, 
6 that's the award; and the child support is to be paid pursuant 
7 to that certain award until the child reaches 18 years of age 
8 or graduates from high school, whichever event occurs last. 
9 In terms of alimony, the standard for awarding alimony 
10 is to evaluate the recipient's need, the payer's ability to 
11 pay, and the recipient's ability to support themselves. That 
12 is the standard. 
13 Petitioner, it appears to me, through work, and 
14 respondent, with the sizeable assets, that have been — that 
15 she has and that have been awarded to her, are able to support 
16 themselves. There is not the need. Also, petitioner, it 
17 appears to me, has an inability, if you will, to pay the 
18 respondent alimony. Consequently, as I say, there is no award 
19 of alimony. 
2 0 In terms of the property, in terms of the personal 
21 property, furniture, fixtures, appliances, so forth, that 
22 property is awarded to the party which is in possession of 
23 that property. Subject to any addendums thereon that they 
24 should pay, hold and hold the other party harmless therefrom. 
25 In terms of debts, taxes that are owed, the party 
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1 whose income is taxed must pay the tax and any penalties and 
2 so forth associated with that. There may have been some 
3 joint returns where this applies; but it's the mathematical 
4 computation in terms of the tax, the income, the tax and so 
5 forth, and what taxes are owing. 
6 So what I see here and what I'm ordering is that to 
7 the extent that there's a debt regarding unpaid taxes, then the 
8 party who owes the tax should pay the debt. In terms of joint 
9 debts, if the debt is joint but for the benefit of one party, 
10 then the debt is to be paid by that party. 
11 In terms of the debts that I saw were debts for the 
12 children's therapy and so forth in that area, it appears to me 
13 the respondent's in a better position to pay that debt, and is 
14 ordered to pay those debts and discharge all other joint debts. 
15 So if it's your debt, you have to pay it. If it's a joint debt 
16 or a debt incurred for the children, respondent pays those 
17 debt. 
18 In the caveat I would add to this is if there is an 
19 order, not a temporary order, that modifies this — that is, 
20 one party was ordered to pay it — and it was not reserved for 
21 my further determination, even though it may fall into some 
22 category that the respondent is now required to pay, then that 
23 order is the one to be followed. 
24 That includes — now, let me add further so there's 
25 I no misunderstanding. Although in terms of the reviewing — I 
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1 hesitate here, because as I say, I tried to determine whether 
2 there were other orders that were not considered temporary 
3 orders, that might impact this, and I am not clear. 
4 So that's why I'm adding that caveat; but I'm 
5 including in this the debts for the special master, the 
6 therapists for the children, and these sort of things. 
7 Hereafter, the fees for the special master and coordinator 
8 and the therapists for the children are to be paid equally by 
9 both parties. 
10 I'll tell you why I do that. I think there's some 
11 importance that each party participate in these — in this 
12 process in terms of the children and in terms of the special 
13 master and the coordinator, both as a check, if you will, one 
14 on the other, in terms of the use of these things; and I think 
15 there's some importance that there be a financial stake in 
16 these matters to both parties. 
17 Insurance, health insurance for the children is what 
18 I will deal with. The petitioner and respondent are ordered 
19 to maintain health insurance for the use and benefit of the 
20 children, if available through any employment. Then each would 
21 pay one-half of the uninsured. If it is not available through 
22 employment, then a policy of insurance is to be purchased. 
23 Each party is to pay half, and half of the uninsured. 
24 In terms of contempt, the standard in terms of finding 
25 contempt is that the parties must know what the duty imposed by 
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the Court, have the ability to comply with the order, and 
willfully and knowingly refuse to comply. I have examined 
the evidence fairly closely on this, and there's quite a bit. 
I don't know if I'm going to be able to sort it out more 
particularly than this, in terms of this hearing. 
I find that the respondent has been in contempt, 
because she's failed to provide information about the 
children's activities, removed the children from school, 
interfe-ring with parent time, changed the children's school 
enrollment, interfered with phone calls and prevented 
visitation that should have occurred. That she knew of the 
order. She had the ability to comply; and she willfully and 
knowingly refused to comply. 
Consequently I find the respondent is in contempt. 
Make-up visitation which is anticipated, but I don't think 
it's possible in this situation. So I'm not going to try to 
do anything in that regard. However, respondent is to pay to 
petitioner as in the form of attorney's fees a sum of $3,500 
for prosecuting the contempt and to purge the contempt. 
Finally, attorney's fees. The standard in terms of 
review — of awarding attorney's fees, this is 
on my part in terms of the award of attorney's 
a penalty; and I don't view it as such, and it 
as such a penalty that one should pay attorney1 
others. 
discretionary 
fees. It is not 
is not viewed 
s fees of the 
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1 If the fees are awarded, they must be based on the 
2 spouse's financial need, the payer spouse's ability to pay, 
3 and the reasonableness of the requested fees. Another phrase 
4 I think that's used often is "reasonable and necessary." 
5 From the petitioner's side of it, on the main issue 
6 he's not prevailed. I think I could and should take that 
7 into account. I'm also not convinced that all of the fees 
8 are reasonable and necessary. 
9 We have $250,000 in fees in this case; and I've gone 
10 through the accountings, and one cannot pick out, I suppose, 
11 one particular entry or group of entries, and identify those 
12 as unnec — or not reasonable, not necessary. It appears to 
13 me that $250,000 in attorney's fees represents pretty well a 
14 matter that got out of hand, and is not reasonable. 
15 Also from the petitioner's side, it appears that the 
16 fees connected with child custody and related matters have been 
17 paid. Consequently I don't see that there's a financial need 
18 to reimburse those. 
19 So it appears to me that the fact that the petitioner 
20 did not prevail and was not the prevailing party on really what 
21 was the main issue, and apparently so much devoted to that, 
22 both in terms of — certainly in terms of what was presented 
23 here and so forth, did not prevail. 
24 I can take that Into account, coupled with the other 
25 I reasons, is not entitled to a fee; and because he's paid — 
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already paid the fees. Although I understand that these were 
paid by others, is what it may have amounted to, and probably 
did amount to it because of the size of the fees, I don't know 
that he's legally bound to pay" back those debts in terms of the 
fees. 
Consequently I don't see where there's a — he has a 
need — a legal need, as anticipated by our standard here, from 
the respondent to help him pay the fees. In other words, the 
fee's already been paid; and I don't see that he legally has to 
pay back those who helped him pay the fee. 
From the respondent's side, she hasn't — because of 
the assets, that I can take that into account and should take 
it into account, she has no financial need. Petitioner, 
appears to me, has no ability to pay it, in any event. 
Are there any other issues that I have not addressed 
in this determination? 
MS. LEMS: A couple of them, Judge, on my notes. 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MS. LEMS: The award of the parties' vehicles, do you 
want me to go through them one-by-one or just — 
THE COURT: Well, let me ask you this. Was there any 
— what I intended when I said, "Each one in possession gets 
what they have in possession," would that cover it; or is there 
one — is there a vehicle — 
MS. LEMS: Remember there's a boat that's supposedly 
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sitting somewhere at the respondent's mother's home. 
THE COURT: Is that the boat that there was some 
dispute as to who purchased it or bought it? 
MR. BLONQUIST: I don't think there's any dispute about 
that. The money came out of the Fidelity account for the boat. 
Remember there was a boat that was demolished in the accident? 
THE COURT: I remember that, but is there another boat 
— I don't remember the witness. The friend, Ms. Kimball's — 
Ms. Pardeaux's friend who was — the question was whether a 
boat had been purchased? 
MR. BLONQUIST: No, that — 
THE COURT: That's not the boat you're talking — 
MR. BLONQUIST: The boat they have was the one that was 
replaced when the insurance proceeds came in on the boat that 
was — and my client's had possession of that since the — 
well, it's at her mother's, but she has control of it. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. BLONQUIST: So I assume that that's what you meant. 
MS. LEMS: Well, and the boat was certainly in dispute, 
Judge, and you had several (inaudible). 
THE COURT: No, when I made the — no, and that's 
covered I think by my ruling; but I just wanted to clarify, 
because 
evidenc 
friend 
we 
e pj 
who 
had another 
resented. I 
had 
boat in 
guess I 
testified that 
there 
don't 
that there 
remember 
she had purchas 
Ms 
ed 
was some 
. Pardeaux's 
the boat, and 
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1 Ms. Pardeaux was really just storing for her. 
2 MS. LEMS: So I'm clear, is the Court awarding the 
3 respondent the boat? 
4 THE COURT: No, no. Now I'm getting to the boat — 
5 MS. LEMS: Oh. 
6 THE COURT: — now, which you apparently both agreed 
7 which is the boat that was purchased; and I think that falls 
8 under the category; and I intended that to fall into the 
9 category of an asset purchased for the family by the proceeds 
10 of the inheritance. That appears to me where that boat falls 
11 into that spot. 
12 That was also the boat in which there was an altered 
13 check connected with that boat. Here again, it appears 
14 to me that it has the character of a marital asset, because 
15 although it was purchased with the inheritance money, it 
16 remains as the boat for the family. As such, a marital asset, 
17 it's to be sold. Proceeds are to be divided in half. 
18 MS. LEMS: On the vehicles, Judge, just so I'm clear, 
19 each party is awarded any vehicle that are currently in their 
20 possession? 
21 THE COURT: Yes, and all other property that — you 
22 pointed — the boat was an exception to that. That was in 
23 dispute. I don't know if there's anything else that fits into 
J r 
24 that kind of category that we need to deal with. 
25 MS. LEMS: I'm not aware of any right now, Judge. 
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THE COURT: But any property they have in their 
possession is theirs subject to the debt — to any debt. 
MS. LEMS: Next is sue
 r Judge, is tax exemptions, the 
house, the Lori Kay lot, and the children. 
THE COURT: Well, that Lori Kay lot, I think I've 
disposed of, which is that it's to be sold because it again 
is a marital asset. It remains purchased by the inheritance 
money; but purchased for the family, and we already disposed 
of that. I think it's that it's to be sold and — I know there 
may be some trouble doing that; but I don't know of any other 
way to dispose of — to resolve that, other than to order it 
sold and divide it in half. 
MS. LEMS: And in the interim of the sale, Judge, if we 
have property taxes due, what would the Court's order be on 
that? 
THE COURT: Well, if it's marital assets, then they 
should participate equally in any taxes and so forth, the fees, 
and so forth that may be assessed on that property. 
MS. LEMS: The minor children, the award of dependency 
tax deduction? If the Court could make a finding concerning 
whether maybe one parent over another may not be filing a tax 
return? 
THE COURT: Let me ask you both in terms of the tax 
exemption, and I know that had been raised, but let me retain 
just for — I've got an idea, but I haven't considered this. 
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Let me consider it now, but let me first take it — have you 
take really just a minute or two and suggest what you think 
might be fair on that. 
MS. LEMS: Would you like me to start, Judge? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MS. LEMS: What I believe would be fair is in the event 
one parent or the other is filing a tax return, and the other 
parent is not, then of course the parent filing a tax return be 
awarded all four minor children as dependency deductions. 
In the event that the parties are both filing for tax 
returns, presently Mr. Kimball has sole physical custody of 
child Brooke. Presently the respondent has sole physical 
custody of the three remaining children. Presuming that 
they're both filing tax returns, I believe it would be 
reasonable that they be awarded the child currently in their 
sole physical custody. 
The third option, Judge, which would be absolutely 
equalizing and making it fair, is that they're awarded one-half 
each of the children. Currently we have four kids that can be 
claimed as a dependency deduction. Mr. Kimball's awarded two. 
Merae Kimball is awarded two, presuming that they're both 
filing tax returns. 
MR. BLONQUIST: My client will, of course, be filing a 
tax return; and I think that the suggestion made is that they 
claim the child that they have physical custody of. I would 
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1 think that with Mr. Kimball's income, as it's been stated, if 
2 he claimed his own deduction of that one child, he wouldn't 
3 need any more. 
4 I THE COURT: Well, apparently this — I see this as an 
5 J agreement. If you file a tax return, then you're entitled to 
6 take the exemption for the child or children that you have the 
7 physical custody of. 
8 MR. BLONQUIST: Thank you, your Honor. The one point 
9 that I wanted to raise relative to the family home that my 
10 client resides in, you'd mentioned the 50/50. I think it's 
11 only reasonable with the Court's ruling, that Mr. Kimball be 
12 required to pay 50 percent of all of the income — or of the 
13 real property taxes that my client has been — had to pay each 
14 year, including the delinquent taxes that were paid after he 
15 left the home. We could get an accounting on that. 
16 THE COURT: Well, I'm going to decline to do that. 
17 The usual, and I see no reason to vary from this, given 
18 the financial situation of either — of both parties, that 
19 Ms. Pardeaux has the home, was given the — awarded the home, 
20 that she pays all the taxes and fees associated with that home. 
21 In terms of the arrearages, here again I think it's 
22 mainly a matter of who's in a better financial position to pay 
23 a debt incurred on joint property. Who has the money to pay it 
24 on joint property? He doesn't have a greater obligation than 
25 she does. She has a better — I agree to find that she has a 
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greater financial ability. So I'll have her pay it. 
MS. LEMS: One last thing on my notes, if I may, Judge. 
We had requested — and at the time of argument, this well have 
been our responsive, post-trial brief — that the Court make 
finding regarding the date of valuation at the time of the 
parties' separation, rather than at the time the bifurcated 
divorce. Does the Court have a finding on that issue? 
THE COURT: Tell me again, please. 
MS. LEMS: We had requested that the Court make a 
finding regarding the date for valuation of the parties' 
marital estate at the time of the parties' separation. 
Remember, Judge, they separated on or about latter part of 
February, first part of March of 2002, versus the date of 
valuation, which would have been at the time of the bifurcated 
divorce. That occurred, Judge, on August 8th of 2003. 
THE COURT: What would be the need to make such a 
finding, the way I've approached it and awarded the property? 
Is there a need to make that kind of a finding? 
MS. LEMS: I believe that there is, Judge; and I 
believe it's for purposes of determining the debt (inaudible) 
and asset values; and for purposes of any type of appeal that 
either party may make. 
THE COURT: Well, I'm not — I don't know that I have 
— you didn't present me with enough evidence in terms of that 
kind of asset evaluation; but I don't know that I need to make 
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that finding in order to reach the conclusions that I reach. I 
think that's the findings that I need to make, that support the 
conclusions that I reached. I don't see that I need to do 
that. 
Anything further? 
MR. BLONQUIST: Yes, your Honor, one other item. You 
may have covered it, and excuse me if you have, but I don't 
think that you have. When we settled the custody issue, we 
reserved for your Honor an allocation of costs of our expert 
witnesses; and I believe that that should be addressed. 
We have set — provided to the Court by affidavit what 
we have paid and what we still owe on those. I think that it's 
appropriate for your Honor to allocate whether each side should 
total it and pay half, 50/50; or whether the party incurring 
the debt should pay the debt. I just raise that point because 
it was something that was not resolved, and was specifically 
referred -- reserved to your Honor. 
Now, as I understand your ruling, you have mentioned 
the special master's fees; and you've talked about therapists; 
and you've talked about ongoing therapy that you think would be 
beneficial 
split. 
issue of 
separate 
I 
— 
to the family. Therefore, 
believe that none of those 
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1 custody issue. There was a fee to — well, I think it's 
2 appropriate that you address each of the costs of each of the 
3 experts that were identified in the witness lists. I would 
4 suggest that that be a matter that be divided 50/50 between the 
5 parties. Irll submit it. 
6 THE COURT: Thank you. Ms. Lemsr do you want to — 
7 wish to comment about that? I might indicate that I didn't 
8 say anything, but I have considered that and — in terms of the 
9 I costs of litigation. Go ahead — let me — 
10 MS. LEMS: If I may, Judge. 
11 THE COURT: Yes. 
12 MS. LEMS: My concern would be, as we indicated in 
13 our memorandum in response to the respondent's affidavit of 
14 attorney's fees and costs, it appears that the respondent had 
15 at least four different non-Court appointed experts lined up. 
16 Off the top of my head, Judge, and please don't 
17 quote me on it, because I don't remember what it was; but I 
18 believe she had expert fees totaling well over 30 to $40,000. 
19 As indicated in our responsive brief, I believe it's very 
20 unreasonable that Mr. Kimball have to bear any of the burden 
21 of the respondent's non-Court appointed experts. 
22 Mr. Kimball, as the Court notes from his own affidavit 
23 of attorney's fees and costs, had incurred his own rebuttal 
24 expert, Dr. Donna Strassberg. We had requested in our affidavit 
25 of attorney's fees and costs that Ms. Kimball pay one-half of 
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his fees. He certainly was a whole lot less than the 30 to 
$40,000 for her four other non-Court appointed experts. 
THE COURT: May I ask this question. In terms of what 
might fit into the category of "Court appointed experts," the 
custody evaluator would fit into that category. I don't know 
if there's any others here that would fit into that category. 
Is there? 
MS. LEMS: I believe maybe Jill — Dr. Jill Sanders, 
who was appointed by this Court, if you remember, Judge, by 
stipulation of the parties, as a special master, as and for 
the best interests of the children. 
What I understand from what was testified to, is that 
the parties were paying one-half of the special master fees. 
Your findings today reflect that. However, the Court hasn't 
yet made findings on Dr. Davies. 
If I recall the testimony, Judge — and again please 
don't quote me, because I don't have my notes on that — 
but I believe that Mr. Kimball had paid an extra $2,000 to 
Dr. Davies. 
THE COURT: Do you want to say anything further, 
Mr. Blonquist? 
MR. BLONQUIST: Well, just briefly, and here again, I 
don't want you to quote me either, but I think if you look at 
the accounting, we've paid more than half of Dr. Davies' fees; 
and I think that in analyzing it, you're correct. There is 
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1 only one Court appointed custody — or expert. 
2 I think that it's fair that the parties equally share 
3 that expense. If we've paid our half, then that takes care of 
4 it; but if we've paid more than our share, then that should be 
5 an adjustment. 
6 THE COURT: Was there any — this also would fit into a 
7 category, I think, of is there an order not anticipated to be a 
8 temporary order or reserving the issue for the trial, that any 
9 of these people, including the custody evaluator, that their 
10 fees were to be paid by one party or the other? 
11 MR. BLONQUIST: No, that is — 
12 THE COURT: That was either left up in the air or 
13 reserved? 
14 MR. BLONQUIST: It was reserved. 
15 THE COURT: Reserved. 
16 MR. BLONQUIST: It was reserved at the time of our 
17 settlement of the issues related to custody. 
18 MS. LEMS: If I may, Judge, on that question. If 
19 the Court were to look at the order regarding custody and 
20 related matters as entered by this Court on or about March 10th 
21 of this year, you reserved the issues of the costs of the 
22 special master. You reserved the issues concerning the custody 
23 evaluator, Court appointed evaluation, including the costs for 
24 any and all experts from both parties concerning the custody 
25 portion of this matter are hereby reserved. 
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1 THE COURT: Well, let me make this determination. 
2 It would be my intention — (inaudible) say I glossed over 
3 I it in some way here — is that the costs of litigation, which 
4 included the expert fees and any depositions and any costs of 
5 litigation are to be born by the party incurring those costs. 
6 In terms of the custody evaluator, Court appointed 
I • 
7 evalu — Court appointed experts, those fees are to be paid in 
8 equal share by the parties. Let me clarify again, so there's 
9 no misunderstanding. 
10 In terms of the special master and the coordinator 
11 and the therapists, I'm having Ms. Pardeaux, unless there's an 
12 order, as I say, to the contrary — apparently there isn't, but 
13 if there's a dispute about that then we'll have to sort that 
14 out — but Ms. Pardeaux paying their fees. So these are — 
15 these are Court appointed people, but — to be certain, but 
16 I'm having her pay the fees up to this point. Then hereafter 
17 it's to be divided in half. I've given you the reasons why I 
18 do that. 
19 In terms of the custody evaluator, it seems to me that 
20 that's also Court appointed, but for such an evaluation I think 
21 it appropriate that the fee be divided in half and each pay 
22 one-half. That's how I'll decide it. 
23 MR. BLONQUIST: Let me just say this, and we may have 
24 to look into it, but from the time of the appointment of the 
25 special master, which was Lisa Reading, each of the parties 
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1 have been presented a bill. We've each paid our half. As far 
2 as the parental coordinator is concerned, that's been the same 
3 also. We've received bills/ and each of the parties have paid 
4 half. So we're talking about Lisa Reading, and we're talking 
5 about Jill Sanders. 
6 THE COURT: Very well. 
7 MS. LEMS: Whether the parties have paid one-half, 
8 Judge, if you recall, that was the subject of many temporary 
9 hearings. In fact, the Court's file is awash with letters from 
10 Dr. Davies, from Lisa Jones Reading and so forth that Merae 
11 Kimball had not paid her one-half. 
12 THE COURT: Well, and I'm not — as I say, I'm giving 
13 you a formula; and if there is an order that's a permanent 
14 order that is otherwise, I'm going to state it again, then 
15 that is the governing order. 
16 Absent that, the special master, the coordinator, 
17 the therapists, I'm having Ms. Pardeaux pay whatever is the 
18 outstanding balance. The reason I'm doing that is because she 
19 has the assets to be able to do that. Those are debts that 
20 need to be paid. They were — they're debts I think that are 
21 incurred by and for both parties, and for the children for both 
22 I parties. 
23 That's the — a special master is not a special master 
24 for the economic issues. There's the children's issues. These 
25 I people need to be paid; and I'm looking to the party that's in 
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1 the financial position to be able to pay these. 
2 MR. BLONQUIST: As in what — 
3 THE COURT: And I think that's — the reason I think 
4 that's fair and appropriate and I think legally sound also is 
5 that, as I say, these are debts for the children, and to assist 
6 in terms of the children, and should be paid by — from here on 
7 out, one-half each; but there's been a debt incurred. Those 
8 need to be paid, and respondent has the assets to do that. 
9 MR. BLONQUIST: As of what date, your Honor? You said 
10 if there's an outstanding balance owed, she's to pay it? 
11 THE COURT: I'm willing to take it back. Irm willing 
12 to take it back to the time of the first day of trial. 
MR. BLONQUIST: First day of trial? Remember, that was 
November. 
THE COURT: Whatever date it is. 
MR. BLONQUIST: Okay, I just — 
THE COURT: I think that's the — 
MR. BLONQUIST: I wanted to remind you that it was 
November, not April. If you have that in mind and that's your 
order, I respect that. 
THE COURT: The first day of trial. Anything further? 
13 
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MS. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
LEMS: No, thank you, your Honor. I 
COURT: Appreciate it. 
BLONQUIST: Thank you. 
COURT: We'll be in recess. 
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1 MR. BLONQUIST: All right. 
2 THE COURT: Let me — but let me resolve one other 
3 thing. That is the drawing of the findings and conclusions 
4 and the decree. That incorporates, I suppose, all that was 
5 agreed upon in terms of the custody and related matters, all 
6 that I had decided, and (inaudible) covers all of it. 
7 MR. BLONQUIST: It does, yes. 
8 THE COURT: Mr. Blonquist, I think I'll look to you to 
9 do t h a t . 
1 0 MR. BLONQUIST: I w i l l do i t . 
1 1 THE COURT: W e ' l l be i n r e c e s s . 
1 2 MS. LEMS: Thank you. 
13 (Hearing concluded) 
REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
I, Beverly Lowe, a Notary Public m and for the 
State of Utah, do hereby certify: 
That this proceeding was transcribed under my 
direction from the transmitter records made of these 
meetings. 
That this transcript is full, true, correct, and 
contains all of the evidence and all matters to which the 
same related which were audible through said recording. 
I further certify that I am not interested m the 
outcome thereof. 
That certain parties were not identified in the 
record, and therefore, the name associated with the 
statement may not be the correct name as to the speaker. 
WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL this 6th day of June 2005. 
My commission expires, 
February 24, 2008 jzjx&t 
Beverly Lowe 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing in Utah County 
BEVERLY LOWE 
Notary Public 
State of Utah 
My Commission Expires Feb 24 2008 
[1909 S Washington Ave , Provo, UT 84606I 
ADDENDUM "D 
JAMES LEWIS KIMBALL MINUTE ENTRY 
Case No. 024901659 
V. Judge Fratto 
MERAE KIMBALL 
The matter is before the court to consider a series of post-trial motions. For the reasons 
given, these motions are denied. 
Petitioner's Rule 60(b) Motion to Set Aside Amended Decree and Findings of Fact 
And Conclusions of Law 
With this motion, petitioner objects to certain written findings as contrary to the court's 
in-court declarations. Respondent's argument that use of Rule 60(b) to raise petitioner's 
objections is well taken. Nevertheless, the court's has substantively reviewed the objections and, 
although expressqd with different terminology from that used in court, the amended findings 
submitted by respondent correctly capture the court's findings. Specifically, the court found that 
petitioner altered checks obtained from respondent without her permission. The term "forgery" 
correctly characterizes this activity. 
Respondent's Motion to Amend Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
and Amended Decree of Divorce 
With this motion, respondent urges the court to reconsider the determination that 
petitioner used proceeds obtained through forgery for "family purposes," and that respondent is in 
un n 
contempt of court. The argument is that the evidence does not support the findings and the 
determination thereon when the correct standards and burden of proof are applied. 
It is petitioner's burden to show that he used the proceeds from forgery for family 
purposes. The court may consider his testimony and give it the weight and credibility it deserves. 
The reasonable inferences that are drawn from all the evidence may be considered; the dearth of 
evidence to the contrary weighed. There may be differing views of the evidence, the credibiUty of 
the witness' and the inferences that may be reasonably drawn therefrom, but the court is not 
convinced that it either used an incorrect standard of proof or erred as to the evidence to be 
applied to that standard. 
Respondent's Motion for Sanctions Under Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure 
With this motion, respondent requests sanctions for having to respond to petitioner's 
motion to extend the time to file a memorandum. Petitioner's request was considered by the court 
as properly made ex parte; no response from respondent was anticipated. The extension was 
granted. 
Although the timeliness of petitioner's request may be questioned, sanctions pursuant to 
Rule 11 are not appropriate because the court has not been intentionally misled or the request 
made for an improper purpose. 
Respondent's Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions 
With this motion, respondent requests sanctions against petitioner because of 
2 
tLfir//st 
misrepresentations in their Rule 60(b) motion. There was evidence that petitioner had applied for 
credit in connection with an auto sale and inflated his income on the application. Whether 
petitioner intended to inflate his monthly or yearly income is unclear and open to different views 
of the evidence on that point. Consequently, petitioner's representations about the evidence that 
take one view to the exclusion of the other is appropriate. There does not appear to be an 
intention to mislead or misrepresent. 
Respondent's Motion to Strike (Affidavit of Michelle Burk) 
This motion begs the question: Can the court consider a transcript of court proceedings 
not produced by an "official court transcriber," as defined by Rule 3-305 Rules of Judicial 
Administration? 
The rule is silent on this question, and there does not otherwise appear to be a prohibition 
on the trial court's consideration of an unofficial transcript. There was no misrepresentation of 
die transcribers status, and no allegation that the transcript that was produced had material errors. 
This minute entry constitutes the order regarding the matters addressed herein. No further 
order is required. 
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ADDENDUM "E 
FBLED BJSTR1CT V « » " B 
Third Judicial District 
MAR j 0 2005 
Christopher J. Rogers, #10104 
LEMS LAW OFFICE, P.C. 
7050 South Union Park Center, Suite 350 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84047 
Telephone (801)256-9500 
Facsimile (801) 255-2442 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES LEWIS KIMBALL, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
MERAE KIMBALL, 
Respondent 
ORDER RE: CUSTODY AND RELATED 
MATTERS 
Civil No: 024901659 DA 
Judge Joseph C. Fratto 
Commissioner Susan C. Bradford 
Trial having been scheduled in the above-entitled matter from November 29, 2004, 
through December 8, 2004, and based upon partial stipulation of the parties entered on the record 
at time of trial scheduled on November 30, 2004, before the Honorable Judge Joseph C. Fratto, 
Jr.; Petitioner* James Kimball along with his counsel of record, Wendy J. Lems and Christopher 
Rogers of Lems Law Office, P.C. being present; Respondent, Merae Kimball being present with 
her counsel of record, Thomas R. Blonquist; and Guardian Ad Litem, Robert Steele being 
present as and for the minor children, the Court having heard and accepted the partial stipulation 
of the parties regarding custody of the minor children and related matters thereto; having 
considered the pleadings on file, and for good cause shown, does hereby enter the following: 
IT IS HEREBY FOUND AND ORDERED: 
1. Custody: 
a. The Court does hereby find that it is in the best interests of the minor children that 
the parties will share equally in the joint legal and joint physical custody of the 
children, to-wit: Amanda, Daniel, and Ryker Kimball shall be under the primary 
physical custody of Respondent, with Petitioner exercising parent-time pursuant 
herein; Brooke Kimball shall be under the primary physical custody of Petitioner, 
with Respondent having therapeutic parent-time visitation with Brooke as detailed 
herein. 
2. Primary Residence of the Children: 
a. The primary residence for Amanda, Daniel, and Ryker Kimball is with the 
Respondent, Merae Kimball. 
b. The primary residence for Brooke Kimball is with the Petitioner, James Kimball. 
3. Parent-Time Planning Meeting and Parent-Coordinator: 
a. On a monthly basis, the parties shall meet with parent-coordinator, Dr. Jill 
Sanders, to discuss parent-time for the parties (hereinafter "Parent-Time Planning 
Meeting"). As part of the parties' Parent-Time Planning Meetings, the parties 
under the direction of Dr. Jill Sanders shall plan their respective parent-time with 
the minor children in advance for at least sixty (60) days. At the direction of Dr. 
oaiiucis or as may be reasonably necessaiy, the parties may be required to meet 
more or less often than a monthly basis for their respective parent-time meetings 
with Dr. Sanders. 
b. At the Parent-Time Planning Meetings, Dr. Sanders shall discuss the parent-time 
with the parties, assist the parties in planning the parent-time schedule, make 
suggestions concerning the same, including but not limited to the scheduling of 
extra curricular activities, events, holidays, summertime parent-time, vacations, or 
trips. Dr. Sanders shall also suggest therapist(s) for any of the minor children, 
suggest therapy or other parenting classes for any party, make suggestions 
concerning any and all child care, suggest any modifications concerning parent-
time, and shall be able to write correspondence to the Court provided Dr. Sanders 
submits copy of the correspondence to all counsel in this matter. 
c. Dr. Jill Sanders shall have "dual" roles as: (1) the family therapist and (2) the 
parent-coordinator. Further, Lisa Jones-Reading shall continue as the "Special 
Master" in this matter. The parties agree that two separate orders shall be 
prepared, drafted and entered for Dr. Jill Sanders and Lisa Jones-Reading 
concerning their respective powers and responsibilities in this matter. 
d. The parties will follow any and all suggestions and recommendations of the 
parent coordinator, Jill Sanders subject to the appeal process as described herein. 
e. Dr. Jill Sanders has a very broad role as described herein and as more fully 
memorialized in Order of Parent Coordinator, to be filed herewith. However, the 
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the minor children as set forth herein. 
4. Appeal Process: 
a. In the event of impasse or disagreement between the parties pursuant to the 
Parent-Time Planning Meeting, any party may submit the issue to Special Master 
Lisa Jones-Reading for decision. Within a reasonable period of time, the Special 
Master shall issue her decision to the parties. The decision of the Special Master 
shall be effective when issued whether in writing or orally. 
b. If either party desires to appeal or otherwise object to the decision of the Special 
Master, either party may submit the issue to the Court for decision by filing a 
Motion for Order to Show Cause. 
5. Extra-Circular Activities and Events: 
a. The Parties agree that each child shall be involved in no more than one (1) sport 
per season. 
b. Music practice and lessons for the children concerning the same shall be ongoing 
and shall continue, excluded from the provisions of paragraph 5(a). 
c. Both parties may attend any extra-curricular activity or event of any of the 
children, if the party so desires. 
d. Neither party shall have any contact or communication with the other party, 
including direct face-to-face or indirect non-verbal communication. 
e Durin0 the extra-curricular sctivit~r or even** the children shall have ability to 
freely contact or communicate with any parent The parties shall not discourage 
the children from contacting or communicating with the other parent at extra-
curricular activities or events. 
f. For any and all extra-curricular activities and events of the children, whichever 
parent is exercising parent-time according to the Parent-Time Planning Meeting 
and direction of Dr. Sanders, is responsible for transportation to and from the 
extra-curricular activity and/or event. 
g. If activities are not scheduled during the Parent-Time Planning Meeting with Dr. 
Sanders as identified above, the extra-curricular activity and/or event shall not 
occur. 
6. Holidays, Vacations and Trips: 
a. If either party desires to take any of the children out of the Salt Lake Valley for 
one or more overnights, the requesting party shall provide at least thirty (30) day 
advance written notice to both the other party and Dr. Jill Sanders. The notice 
shall include but not limited to the itinerary, reservation confirmation numbers, 
any and all dates and times of arrival and departure, addresses and phone numbers 
where the children can be reached. 
b. Any and all trips or vacations shall be planned in conjunction with the Parent-
Time Planning Meeting and Dr. Sanders. Every effort should be made to plan any 
and all trips or vacation on the requesting parents' parent-time. 
c. AIIW siid all holidays "iirsuaiji to UTAH CODE AN7\. £ 30-3-35. attached hereto as 
Exhibit " 1 , " shall take precedence over the parent-time schedule of either party, 
unless directed otherwise by Dr. Sanders. 
d. The parties' respective Summer time, extended or otherwise parent-time with the 
children will be addressed and coordinated with the parent coordinator, Dr. Jill 
Sanders. * 
7. Parent-Time: 
a. Petitioner shall be entitled, at least as a default provision, to a specific parent-time 
schedule with children Amanda, Daniel, and Ryker Kimball. This schedule may 
be modified during the Parent-Time Planning Meeting by Dr. Jill Sanders. 
b. Petitioner monthly parent-time schedule for Amanda, Daniel, and Ryker Kimball 
shall be as follows: 
i. For the first week of each month, Petitioner shall have overnight weekend 
parent-time visitation from Friday at 7:00pm to Sunday at 7:00pm. 
ii. For the second week of each month, Petitioner shall have mid week 
visitation every Thursday from 5:30pm to 9:00pm. 
iii. For the third week of each month, Petitioner shall have overnight weekend 
parent-time from Friday at 6:00pm to Monday morning in which 
Petitioner shall take/facilitate the children's attendance at school, if in 
session. If school is not in session, the Petitioner shall facilitate the return 
of the children to the Respondent by 9:00 a.m. 
fs I I 
time from 5:30pm to 9:00pm. 
c. With respect to Amanda Kimball, Petitioner agrees to be flexible in his 
scheduling and exercise of parent-time as Amanda Kimball is entering her 
teenage years. 
d. All parent-time, whether holiday or non-holiday, is subject to change or 
modification by the parent-coordinator, Dr. Jill Sanders. 
e. Petitioner, James Kimball, shall provide transportation for any of the children 
during the exercise of Petitioner's parent-time. 
8. School: 
a. The parties' minor children, Daniel Kimball and Ryker Kimball, shall remain in 
their current school and shall not be transferred to Oakridge Elementary. 
9- Brooke Kimball: 
a. Brooke Kimball shall continue therapy with Dr. Patiicia Hopps, as needed or 
suggested by Dr. Sanders and/or Dr. Hopps. The purpose of therapy between 
Brooke Kimball and Dr. Hopps is to facilitate relationship and therapeutic parent-
time visitation between Brooke Kimball and Respondent, Merae Kimball. 
b. Petitioner agrees to provide, within a reasonable period of time, the use of an 
automobile and cellular phone for Brooke Kimball. As a result, the parties agree 
that Brooke Kimball may use the automobile and/or cellular phone to freely, at 
7 1 / - * * 
the discretion of Bi coke Kimball to corit^ct communicate or visit sir- of the 
parties at any time. 
10. Disparaging: 
a. Neither party shall disparage and/or slander the other party, or allow or permit 
other parties in their direct control to do the same, in the presence of any of the 
minor children. 
b. Neither party shall allow or permit any third parties in their direct control to 
disparage and/or slander either party in the presence of any of the minor children. 
11. Therapy: 
a. The parent coordinator, Dr. Jill Sanders can recommend and suggest additional, 
alternate or modified therapy as and for any of the minor children, and the 
parents. The parties will reasonably and timely cooperate in any and all 
suggestions of the parent coordinator for the same. 
12. Reserved Issues: 
a. The issue of the costs of Special Master are reserved, if no settlement of the same. 
b. The issue of costs concerning the custody evaluator, court-appointed evaluation, 
including the costs for any and all experts from both parties concerning the 
custody portion of this matter are hereby reserved. 
c. The issue of child support is reserved, if no settlement of the same. 
13. The parties will pay one-half (1/2) each of any and all costs associated with Parent 
Coordinator, Dr. Jill Sanders in a timely and reasonable manner. 
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NOTICE PURSUANT TO RULE 7 
OF UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
TO THE RESPONDENT AND HER COUNSEL, THOMAS R. BLONQUIST: 
Notice is hereby given that pursuant to Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, that 
this Proposed Order prepared by the Petitioner shall be the Order of the Court unless you file an 
objection in writing within five (5) days from the date of the service of this notice. 
ADDENDUM "F" 
n r 11: e i 
Wendy J. Lems, #7409 
LEMS LAW OFFICE, P.C. 
7050 South Union Park Center, Suite 350 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84047 
Telephone (801) 256-9500 
Facsimile (801) 255-2442 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES LEWIS KIMBALL, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
MfiRAE KIMBALL, 
Respondent. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF RULE 
60(B) MOTION TO SET ASIDE 
AMENDED DECREE OF DIVORCE AND 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No: 024901659 DA 
Judge Joseph C. Fratto 
Commissioner Susan C. Bradford 
COMES NOW Petitioner, James Kimball, by and through counsel of record, Wendy J. 
Lems of Lems Law Office, P.C, respectfully submits this Memorandum in Support of 
Petitioner's Rule 60(b) Motion to Set Aside Amended Decree of Divorce and Amended Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered in this matter on September 21,2005, based upon the 
ruling of the Honorable Judge Joseph C. Fratto at divorce hearing held May 24,2005. The 
Petitioner respectfully requests that certain provisions of the Amended Decree of Divorce and 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions thereon as signed by the Court on September 19,2005, and as 
entered on September 21, 2005, be set aside, as such orders do not accurately reflect Judge 
$&P 
Fratto's Findings and Orders as made at the time of hearing on May 24, 2005. Rule 60(b) 
provides that a Court may upon motion reverse the finality of a judgment or order for reasons 
including mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; fraud, misrepresentation or other 
misconduct of an adverse party; or any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the 
judgment. 
FACTS 
1. The Court held trial in the above-entitled matter on November 30,2004, December, 2, 3, 6, 
7, 8, 10 and 14, 2004, and April 12 and 13, 2005. The Court took the matter under 
advisement and issued Ruling from the bench on May 24, 2005. At the time of such Ruling, 
the Court directed counsel for the Respondent to submit a proposed Decree of Divorce and 
proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Counsel for the Respondent on 
September 19, 2005 submitted proposed "Amended Decree of Divorce" and proposed 
"Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law" to the Court without the Petitioner's counsel's 
approval to form, and the Court entered the same on September 21,2005. 
2. On or about September 29,2005, Respondent, by and through counsel, submitted a second 
set of orders as entitled "Motion to Amend Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Amended Decree of Divorce.*' Such documents were not titled properly as "Second 
Amended Decree of Divorce" and "Second Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law." Additionally, the mailing certificate to the Respondent's counsel is dated September 
29, 2005; however the post-mark for such mailing to counsel for the Petitioner is dated 
October 3,2005. 
2 
ARGUMENT 
The Petitioner hereby requests that this Court set aside the Amended Decree of Divorce 
and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered on September 21, 2005 pursuant to Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b) as such orders do not accurately reflect Judge Fratto's Findings 
and Orders as made at the time of hearing on May 24, 2005. Rule 60(b) provides that a Court 
may upon motion reverse the finality of a judgment or order for reasons including: (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence; (3) fraud, 
misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the 
judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; or (6) any other reason justifying relief 
from the operation of the judgment. Furthermore, the Utah Supreme Court has held that a Utah 
Court may "vacate, set aside, or modify its orders or judgments entered by mistake or 
inadvertences which do not accurately reflect the result of its judgment" and that "the authority 
of a court to cause its proceedings and its judgments and orders to be correctly set forth in its 
records is necessarily inherent in its powers for the purpose of administering justice." Meagher v. 
Equity Oil Co., 299 P.2d 827, 830 (Utah, 1956). The provisions of the Amended Decree of 
Divorce and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law which do not accurately reflect the 
Court's ruling of May 24,2005, should be set aside pursuant to Rule 60{b)(l)(3) and (6). Such 
provisions are as follows: 
I. ALLEGED UNAUTHORIZED CHECKS 
Paragraph 7 of the Amended Decree of Divorce and corresponding paragraph 9 in the 
Conclusions of Law do not accurately reflect the order of this Court. The Amended Decree of 
Divorce reads, "Petitioner shall not be punished . . . for . . . forging Respondent's name... and 
altering the amount of checks written." Emphasis added. The Court made no such finding. In 
fact, the Honorable Judge Fratto said that contrary to finding a preponderance that the Petitioner 
took money to use solely for his benefit, "I found otherwise in terms of the evidence that was 
presented in front of me, and I'm not drawing the interferences that [the Respondent is] 
suggesting from the evidence." (See Transcript of Court's Ruling of May 24, 2005, attached 
hereto as Exhibit "1 , " page 3, lines 113 through 115.) Judge Fratto specifically declined to 
accept the Respondent's "invitation to award all the equity in the Village Point home to her 
because of the Petitioner's altering of the checks" because such ruling would be a penalty upon 
the Petitioner. The Judge refused to impose such penalty, finding that the money was used for 
the family's benefit. (Exhibit 1, page 3, lines 110 through 121. See also Exhibit "1 , " page 2, 
lines 79-90). 
Therefore, paragraph 7 of the Amended Decree should be set aside and modified omitting 
the term "forging" therefrom and corresponding paragraph 9 of the Conclusions of Law should 
also be set aside and modified to remove such terminology which was not found or used by the 
above-entitled Court at the time of the Court's Ruling on May 24,2005. 
II. FINDINGS OF FACT NUMBER 5 
Based on the reasoning above and the Court's findings, the Court also considered at time 
of trial Petitioner's allegations of "co-mingling" of the stock purchase agreement monies, (as 
identified by Respondent, as "shares of the family business") in the Amended Decree of Divorce. 
Therefore, paragraph 5 of the Findings of Fact should address not only claims of "inheritance 
and enhancement" but also "co-mingling." 
Additionally, nowhere in the Findings of Fact did it identify that the Respondent acquired 
on or about 1976, prior to the parties' marriage, approximately 1005 shares of stock in Utah 
Bearing and Fabrication, Inc. (hereafter, "Utah Bearing"). Additionally, nowhere in the Findings 
of Fact does it identify that on or about 1994, dispute ensued between Respondent and Utah 
Bearing concerning the value of Respondent's stock and the potential purchase of Respondent's 
stock from Utah Bearing. 
Furthermore, nowhere in the Findings of Fact does it identify the findings and evidence 
presented to the Court at time of trial as follows: 
a. At the time of the parties' marriage, the Petitioner was employed at Jorgensen 
Appraisal and Respondent was employed as a teacher for Granite School District. 
b. On or about February 1988, Petitioner was employed with Utah Bearing, 
Respondent's father's family business. 
c. On or about June 1990, Petitioner began work for Cate Equipment, also known or 
other subsidiary of Utah Bearing, Respondent's father's family business. At about this same 
time, Respondent quit her job at Granite School District. 
d. The parties' relationship deteriorated and Petitioner and Respondent separated on 
or about late February, 2002 or early March, 2002. 
e. After the death of Respondent's father, Frank Pardoe on August 9,1993, Frank 
Pardoe had a will that left everything via a residuary clause, including all of Mr. Pardoe's stock 
interest that he possessed, to the James Franklin Pardoe Trust. Respondent, Merae Kimball, then 
Merae Pardoe, was one of the beneficiaries to the trust along with Respondent's mother and 
other siblings. 
f. On or about November 1993, Frank Pardoe's heirs including Respondent, 
specifically agreed to alter the terms of the Will to have all testamentary devises and bequests in 
the Will go outright to Respondent's mother, Cherie Pardoe, instead of to the Trust as specified 
in the residuary clause of the Will. 
g. On or about November 1,1993, approximately three (3) months after Frank 
Pardoe died, Respondent received stock from resolution of the Board of Directors of Utah 
Bearing canceling all previously issued shares of the Corporation and issued new 1005 Class A 
voting stock to Respondent, during her marriage to the Petitioner. 
h. On or about 1994, Respondent received an initial offer from Derek Pardoe, 
Respondent's brother and former President of Utah Bearing, for purchase of Respondent's 1005 
stock shares in an approximate amount of $1,700,000.00. 
i. Thereafter, after discussions between the parties, Petitioner and Respondent, and 
in discussions and advise with family friend, Robert Rice and Petitioner's uncle, Kay Lewis, 
Respondent was referred to attorney Thomas KLC/Kelch. 
j . On March 24,1995, Respondent sold her 1005 shares of stock in Utah Bearing 
pursuant to Stock Purchase Agreement dated March 24,1995, for $2,500,000.00. 
k. On or about March 24,1995, Respondent received the five hundred thousand 
dollars ($500,000.00) down payment from the Stock Purchase Agreement. 
L On or about March 24,1995, shortly after Respondent received the five hundred 
thousand dollars ($500,000.00) down payment from the Stock Purchase Agreement, Respondent 
deposited the entire $500,000.00 down payment into the parties' joint money market account at 
Zions Bank. 
m. From March 24,1995, to July 1, 1997, the parties received monthly payments in 
the amount of twenty-five thousand three hundred thirty-five dollars and fifteen cents 
($25,335.15) pursuant to the Stock Purchase Agreement of March 24, 1995. These monthly 
payments were deposited into several of the parties' accounts including but not limited to the 
parties' joint Zions Bank account, the parties' joint Bank One account and the parties' Fidelity 
account. 
n. On or about July 1, 1997, Utah Bearing decided to pay off the remaining principle 
balance owed to Respondent under the Stock Purchase Agreement. On or about July 1,1997, 
Respondent received $1,691,963.99 for the remaining principle balance owed to Respondent 
under the Stock Purchase Agreement and the entire amount was deposited in the parties' joint 
Bank One account. Based on the above, the parties incurred tax debt on the Stock Purchase 
Agreement settlement proceeds. The parties' tax obligation, on their joint tax return on such 
proceeds approximated $398,614.00 which the parties' paid on or about 1997 from the Fidelity 
account. 
o. During the parties' marriage, the parties deposited, withdrew, and transferred 
monies in accounts held with Fidelity Investments, Zion's Bank, Bank One, First Security Bank, 
Wells Fargo Bank, and Jay Rice investment accounts for household, family, joint tax obligation 
and marital expenses. 
p. Both parties freely signed each others name on checks, which is common practice 
among married couples. 
WHEREFORE, the above-referenced Findings should be included in the Court's 
Findings of Fact and were an integral part of the evidence submitted and found by the above-
entitled Court. 
III. OUTSTANDING DEBT OWED TO COURT APPOINTED EXPERTS, LISA 
READING, DR. HAYDEE MAS AND JIM HOTTINGER 
In the Amended Decree of Divorce, paragraph 16 and the corresponding paragraphs 
contained in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, paragraphs 88, 90, 91, and 92 should 
be revised to reflect that "Respondent is ordered to pay the outstanding debt to Lisa Reading, 
Esquire and hold the Petitioner harmless therefrom." The Court identified the Court appointed 
experts as Lisa Reading, Dr. Haydee Mas and Jim Hottinger which the Court directed the 
Respondent to pay any and all costs incurred therewith up until the time of the Court's Ruling of 
May 24, 2005, as the Respondent has better financial ability to pay such costs. Hereafter, the 
parties will pay one-half (1/2) of such costs as and for the benefit of the children. (See transcript, 
Exhibit " 1 , " page 12, lines 522 through 538). Likewise paragraphs 90 and 91 as well as 92 of the 
Findings of Fact and paragraph 18 of the Conclusions of Law should be set aside as such 
provisions do not accurately reflect the evidence before the Court nor the Court's Ruling thereon. 
In regards to paragraph 16 and paragraph 92 of the Amended Decree of Divorce, Respondent 
u 
s\ ~*-
was ordered to pay the outstanding.debt owed to Lisa Reading up through the date of the Court's 
Ruling, May 24, 2005. The actual sum of such debt was not entered into evidence nor provided 
by the Respondent. Therefore, the paragraphs as identified should be set aside and the language 
modified to correctly reflect the true orders of this Court. 
IV. MONETARY JUDGMENT 
Paragraph 18 of the Amended Decree of Divorce and paragraph 19 and paragraph 93 of 
the Conclusions of Law award "judgment against the Petitioner in the sum of $5,086.53." Yet 
neither the Court's docket of the hearing nor the transcription of the Judge's order awards the 
Respondent such sum of money. It appears that the Respondent's counsel, in drafting the 
Amended Decree of Divorce and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, has awarded his 
client monies not authorized to her as reimbursement for her payments to Court-appointed 
experts. In reality, the Judge ordered that the Respondent, not the Petitioner, pay all the expert 
"fees up to this point, and then hereafter it is to be divided in half.... In terms of the Custody 
Evaluator... I think it appropriate that the fees be divided in half." (Exhibit 1, page 12, lines 
533 through 537.) [Therefore, fees incurred up until the date of the hearing, May 24,2005, are 
to be paid by the Respondent, but future fees are to be split by the parties.] However, the cost of 
the Custody Evaluator, Dr. Matthew Davies, who according to the Court's Findings of Fact is to 
be equally divided by the parties. 
The Respondent, however, is asking for $5,086.53, an amount reflecting half of the 
outstanding balance owed to the Special Master plus half of the difference in amounts which 
allegedly, the Respondent and the Petitioner have paid for the fees owed to Court-appointed 
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professionals. The Respondent's counsel misrepresents the Judge's actual order on May 24, 
2005. In paragraph 93 of Findings of Facts, counsel for Respondent writes "Based upon the 
disproportionate payments made by the parties to Court ordered professionals, it is reasonable 
that the Petitioner pay the Respondent $5,086.53." Yet the Court explicitly ordered a 
disproportionate payment because the Respondent "has the assets to be able to do that." (Exhibit 
1, page 13, line 558.) The Amended Decree of Divorce should have reflected the Judge's order 
and should read, "The Respondent is to pay any and all outstanding debts owed to Court-
appointed experts from the date of trial to today's date, with the exception of the Custody 
Evaluator whose fee is to be split by the parties. All expenses incurred hereafter are to be split 
by the parties." Such phrasing would accurately represent Judge Fratto's order. 
V. ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS 
Paragraph 24 of the Amended Decree of Divorce and Paragraph 26 of the Conclusions of 
Law do not accurately represent the complete order of this Court. The Amended Decree of 
Divorce reads "Petitioner is not entitled to receive compensation from the Respondent in the 
form of attorney's fees and costs." Judge Fratto in his order addressed the request of attorney's 
fees and costs by both parties and explained why he denied such request by both parties. 
(Exhibit 1, pages 5 and 6, lines 225 through 261.) The Respondent's counsel's inclusion in the 
Amended Decree of Divorce only denial of fees and costs to the Petitioner indicates that the 
Judge considered only a request from Petitioner, when in fact both parties were denied such 
request. The Order should reflect the Judge's full consideration on the matter. The Amended 
Decree of Divorce and the Conclusions of Law should reflect that neither party is entitled to 
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receive attorney's fees and costs from the other party as follows, "Neither the Respondent nor the 
Petitioner has proven the need to be awarded attorney's fees and costs. Further, since Petitioner 
did not prevail on financial issues and therefore is not entitled to an award of his attorney's fees. 
Paragraph 104 through paragraph 107 of the Findings of Fact should be modified in this 
matter to truly reflect the Court's Findings and Ruling as entered at the time of hearing held May 
24,2005. Specifically such paragraphs should be omitted and revised as follows: "The Court 
does hereby find that it has discretion in an award of attorney's fees and costs. The Court will 
not award fees or costs as a penalty that either party should pay. However, if the Court is to 
award fees, the Court must base the same on financial need, ability to pay and the reasonableness 
of requested fees. After reviewing the Petitioner's request for fees, the Court does hereby find 
that the Petitioner has not prevailed. The Court further finds that it is not convinced that all fees 
incurred by the Petitioner were reasonable or necessary as requested in the sum of $250,000.00. 
The Court has reviewed the accountings provided and cannot discern one particular entry or 
group of entries to identify what fees if any may not be reasonable or not necessary. The Court 
does hereby find however that the amount of $250,000.00 in attorney's fees represents that the 
case got out of hand and is not reasonable. Further, in reviewing the Petitioner's request for fees 
it appears that the fees requested that were connected to the child custody and related matters 
have been paid by the Petitioner's family. Based on the same, the Court does not find a financial 
need to reimburse the Petitioner and the Court is not convinced that Petitioner is legally bound to 
pay back those fees as those fees have in large part been paid already by his parents. After 
reviewing the Respondent's request, the Court does hereby find that the Respondent has 
11 
- - i/T\ 
considerable assets which the Court needs to take into account based on her need. In any event, 
the Court finds that the Petitioner has no ability to pay any portion of the Respondent's fees. 
Therefore, the Court finds that both parties will pay their own attorney's fees." (See transcript of 
proceedings, Exhibit u l , " pages 5 and 6, lines 225 through 261). 
WHEREFORE, Petitioner respectfully requests that paragraph 24 of the Amended 
Decree of Divorce as well as paragraph 26 of the Conclusions of Law be modified and the 
language of the Court as identified above, be adopted by this Court pursuant to the Court's 
Ruling of May 24, 2005. 
VI. FORGED/FORGERY 
The Respondent's proposed Findings as contained in paragraphs 33, 39 and 72, are not 
consistent with the Court's orders. Pursuant to the Ruling of the Court at hearing held May 24, 
2005, the Court specifically found that "Petitioner, without authorization, signed the 
Respondent's name to checks, without authorization, altered the amount on certain checks. The 
Court further found that pursuant to a preponderance of the evidence, that the money so obtained 
was used for family purposes and that the only evidence before the Court was Mr. Kimball's 
testimony that the funds were used for family purposes, including all members of the family and 
Mr. Kimball." (See transcript, page 2, lines 79 through 87). Therefore, the Court's Findings and 
Conclusions of Law should be modified to reflect the true representation and findings of this 
Court. At no time did this Court find that the Petitioner had "forged" any checks. 
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VII- LORI KAY HOME 
As proposed by the Respondent in the Findings of Fact, paragraph 41, 42, and 46 was not 
found by the Court and should therefore be stricken. The Court addressed the Lori Kay Home in 
its Ruling of May 24, 2005, as found at transcript, page 2, lines 62 through 77; and page 8, lines 
332 through 337 and nowhere in the Court's Ruling or Findings therefore, does the Court find as 
referenced by the Respondent in the Findings number 41, 42 or 46. Therefore, such added 
Findings which do not correctly reflect the Rulings of this Court nor the evidence presented at 
time of trial, should be stricken. 
Additionally, paragraph 58 of the Findings of Fact should include the language "because 
purchased for the family." (See transcript, page 8, lines 332 through 337). 
Lastly, the Court ordered that if there were any taxes related to the Lori Kay property, 
specifically property taxes, during the pendency of the sale of the Lori Kay lot, that both parties 
were to equally pay any taxes owed. (See transcript, page 8, lines 332 through 343). 
Therefore, such provisions should be added to the proposed Findings of Fact to truly 
reflect the Court's May 24, 2005 Ruling. 
VHL CREDIT APPLICATION 
Respondent has inserted paragraph 37 alleging Petitioner's credit application referenced 
$60,000.00 "per month." The Court in its Findings of May 24, 2005, did not address such credit 
application in any manner, nor is such Finding necessary nor a true reflection of the evidence 
presented. At time of trial, Petitioner testified that the "per month" reference on his credit 
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application meant "per year" and such was a mere inadvertence. Therefore, paragraph 37 should 
either be stricken in its entirety or correctly reflect the testimony provided at time of trial. 
IX. INHERITANCE 
Paragraphs 50 and 51 were not found by the Court nor addressed in any manner in the 
Court's Ruling of May 24, 2005. Such provisions in the Findings of Fact, do not correctly reflect 
the evidence presented at time of trial and therefore, such provisions should be stricken. 
X. TAXES/COLLECTION 
At no time during the Court's Ruling of May 24, 2005, did the Court find the Findings of 
Fact as identified in paragraphs 60 through 65 of the Findings of Fact as proposed by the 
Respondent. Further, evidence speaks for itself and any of the tax returns filed by either party 
and admitted into evidence, correctly reflect their adjusted gross income and the reporting of any 
income earned, whether from Fidelity accounts or otherwise. Therefore, paragraph 60 through 
65 regarding the Petitioner's reported income, interest earnings, or collection actions, is not a 
true reflection of the evidence presented in the trial in this matter nor did the Court make Ruling 
regarding the same at the time of the May 24, 2005 hearing. Therefore such provisions should 
be stricken. 
XI. FIDELITY ACCOUNT 
Paragraph 66 of the Findings contains mistake in the amount remaining in the 
Respondent's Fidelity account. The amount as identified in the exhibits presented and admitted 
by the Court was $1,050,603.63. Therefore paragraph 66 should be amended to accurately 
reflect the amount in the Fidelity account at the time of the parties' separation. 
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Additionally, paragraph 73 through paragraph 77 of the Findings of Fact contains 
inaccuracy which was neither found or ruled upon by the Court in any manner and as such, 
paragraphs 73 through 77 should be stricken from this Court's orders. 
XII. ALIMONY 
Paragraph 83 should be revised to correctly reflect the Court's findings and ruling as 
made at the time of the hearing held May 24, 2005, as follows: "The Court does hereby find that 
both parties make $2,900.00 per month. Although the Petitioner has had a history of making 
more than $2,900.00 a month, at present and based on the evidence presented, Petitioner's gross 
monthly income is $2,900.00. The Court does hereby impute income to the Respondent of 
$2,900.00 based on the Respondent's having taught school in the past and based on her 
testimony of her capability of earning somewhere less than $35,000.00 a year. The Court further 
finds that each party has a need of $3,200.00 a month. Evaluating the recipient/Petitioner's need, 
the payor's ability to pay and the recipient's ability to support themselves, pursuant to the Jones 
v. Jones factors, the Court does hereby find that the Respondent has ability to meet her 
reasonable needs and the Petitioner, has ability through employment to meet his reasonable 
needs. Therefore, the Court does not award alimony as both parties are able to support 
themselves. The Court further finds that the Respondent does not have ability to pay alimony to 
the Petitioner." (See transcript, pages 3 and 4, lines 123 through 156). 
Therefore, paragraph 83 of the Findings should be revised accordingly to reflect the 
Court's Ruling of May 24,2005. 
XIII. MISCELLANEOUS 
Paragraph 103 of the Findings should be modified to include the language "and co-
mingling of Respondent's inheritance." This omission by the Respondent does not truly and 
accurately reflect the trial proceedings before this Court nor the Court's Ruling of May 24, 2005. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, the Petitioner urges this Court to consider the above errors and omissions 
in the forms of the Orders prepared and submitted by counsel for Respondent and that the 
Amended Decree of Divorce and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law thereon as entered by 
this Court on September 21, 2005, be set aside; and that revised and corrected Decree of Divorce 
and Findings be entered consistent with this Court's Findings, admitted evidence and the Court's 
Ruling or May 24, 2005. Additionally, this Court should award the Petitioner his reasonable 
attorney fees and costs for having to file motion for these corrections. 
S E -
DATED THIS ^ O (lay of November, 2005. 
LEMS LAW OFFICE, P.C. 
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ADDENDUM "G 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
APR 2:7 2007 
SALT LAKE COI 
Thomas R. Blonquist, (0369) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
40 South Sixth East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Telephone: (801) 533-0525 
3y. 
, \fftyweterk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MERAE KIMBALL, 
v. 
JAMES L. KIMBALL, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
) FINDINGS OF FACT and 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
) 
Case No. 030902885 
Judge Joseph C. Fratto, Jr. 
The above entitled matter came on for trial before the Honorable Joseph C. Fratto, Jr., 
District Court judge, sitting without a jury, on August 22nd, 23rd, and 24th, 2006,and February 28th and 
March 1st of 2007. The Plaintiff was present represented by her attorney of record, Thomas R. 
Blonquist, and the Defendant was present represented by his attorney of record, Wendy J. Lems. 
After hearing and considering the testimony from the parties and other witnesses, reviewing and 
considering the exhibits received into evidence and considering the statements and arguments of 
counsel and otherwise being fully advised in the premises and good cause appearing therefor, the 
Court now makes and enters, relative to the Plaintiffs claim of unjust enrichment, the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The parties were married and during the course of the marriage, the Plaintiff came into 
a large amount of money, through the sale of stock in her family's business, the "Inheritance 
Money" herein. 
2. Although the Plaintiff intended to use the Inheritance Money for the benefit of her 
family, she both considered and treated it as her sole property. 
3. The Plaintiff placed the Inheritance Money with Fidelity Investments in her name with 
sole check writing authority. 
4. The Defendant was employed during the parties' marriage. 
5. For a time, he worked for the Plaintiffs father in sales and held similar subsequent 
jobs. 
6. It was the Plaintiffs expectation, even though she had a large amount of money, that 
the Defendant would continue to support the family through his employment income, leaving the 
Inheritance Money for travel, large purchases, and as a blanket of financial security. 
7. Among other things, the parties' children were active in tennis and the Plaintiff 
approved using the Inheritance Money to finance that activity. 
8. Historically, the Defendant had been the sole support of the family and assumed the 
day-to-day control and management of the family finances. 
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9. Believing that the Defendant was supporting the family through his income, the 
Plaintiff took little interest in managing the family finances even after receiving the Inheritance 
Money. 
10. The Plaintiff neither interfered with, nor participated in the Defendant's active role in 
the investment account at Fidelity Investments. 
11. There came a time, unbeknown to the Plaintiff, when the Defendant no longer earned 
an income through his employment, although he was still expected to financially support the 
family. 
12. The Defendant began to engage in a pattern of activity, also unbeknown to the 
Plaintiff, that included altering, to higher amounts, checks from the Fidelity Investments account 
given to him by the Plaintiff and signing the Plaintiffs name to checks, with the Defendant or 
"Cash" as the payee. 
13. The Defendant does not deny he engaged in this activity, but maintains that he acted 
consistent with his role as manager of family finances and that the custom of writing checks and 
signing the Plaintiffs name thereto was established during the course of the marriage. 
14. The Defendant contends that the altering and signing of the Plaintiffs name occurred 
with at least the tacit approval of the Plaintiff. 
15. The Defendant further maintains that the proceeds from these checks was used for 
unspecified "family expenses" or "family purposes". 
16. The Plaintiff intended that her Inheritance Money be kept separate and apart from 
joint assets, and that she control its use and disbursement. 
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17. The Defendant was given no authority to alter or sign the Plaintiffs name to Fidelity 
checks, although there may have been infrequent, specific instances to the contrary. 
18. Such authority is not inherent in managing the family finances and the customs of the 
parties'marriage did not establish this precedent. 
19. The Defendant's claim that the proceeds from the altered checks or proceeds from 
checks made payable to "Jim Kimball" or "Cash" were used to satisfy "family expenses" is not 
corroborated by any credible evidence. 
20. These checks were negotiated by the Defendant although the bank records do not 
show a deposit in the household account as would be expected, if the funds were to be expended 
to support the family. 
21. The Defendant, without the consent or knowledge of the Plaintiff and without any 
right so to do, took the Plaintiffs money by either altering check amounts, as shown by Exhibits 
P1-P7, inclusive, or drawing checks with the Defendant or "Cash" as the payee, by the forged 
signature of the Plaintiff, as shown by Exhibits P18-P33, excluding P24 and P27, and P41, P45, 
andP46. 
22. The Defendant has been injustly enriched in that he has taken money in which he was 
not entitled. 
23. The Defendant's actions constitute theft and forgery and he deceived the Plaintiff into 
believing he was working. 
24. The Plaintiff relegated administration of the family finances and investments to the 
Defendant and she did not participate in their day-to-day management. 
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25. The Defendant took improper advantage of his managerial position and the Plaintiffs 
minimal participation and oversight. 
26. At least for the altered checks and those made payable to the Defendant or "Cash", the 
proceeds were not used to financially support the Defendant's family. 
27. These are the circumstances and the "misleading act" that would make it inequitable 
for the Defendant to retain proceeds. 
28. It is reasonable that the Plaintiff be awarded a judgment against the Defendant in the 
sum of $56,800 together with pre-judgment interest on each check from the date thereon, if the 
date is visible, to the date of judgment and, thereafter, at the legal rate. 
29. Accordingly, it is reasonable that a judgment be awarded based upon the following 
checks and pre-judgment interest, from the date shown until April, 20th, the anticipated date of 
the judgment: 
Date Prejudgment Interest to April 20th. 2007 
Oct. 4, 1999 6.513 x 8.5 years=$2,214.42 
June 1,1999 6.513 x 8.83 years=$2,300.39 
April 6, 1999 6.513 x 8 years=$2,084.16 
Jan. 12, 2000 7.67 x 7.25 years=$2,224.30 
Jan. 29, 2000 7.67 x 7.25 years=$2,224.30 
P6 $4,000 Mar. 27,2000 7.67 x 7.083 years=$2,173.06 
Exhibit 
PI 
P2 
P3 
P4 
P5 
Amount 
$4,000 
$4,000 
$4,000 
$4,000 
$4,000 
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P7 
P18 
P19 
P20 
P21 " 
P22 
P23 
P24 
P25 
P26 
P27 
P28 
P29 
P30 
P31 
P32 
P33 
P41 
P45 
$4,000 
$3,000 
$3,000 ' 
$2,000 
$3,000 
$2,000 
$2,000 
$1,399 
$2,000 
$2,000 
$1,000 
$3,000 
$2,000 
$2,000 
$2,000 
$2,000 
$2,000 
$1,800 
$1,000 
Aug. 12,2000 
Mar. 8,2000 
May 2, 2000 
May 10,2000 
June 26, 2000 
July, 18, 2000 
July 29,2000 
Aug. 1,2000 
Aug. 28, 2000 
Sept. 7,2000 
Sept. 27,2000 
Sept. 27,2000 
Oct. 11,2000 
Nov. 8,2000 
Nov. 13,2000 
Nov. 22, 2000 
Nov. 30, 2000 
Oct. 26,2001 
Dec. 19,2001 
7.67 x 6.667 years=$2,045.44 
7.67 x 7.083 years=$ 1,629.79 
7.67 x 6.92 years=$ 1,592.29 
7.67 x 6.92 years=$ 1,061.53 
7.67 x 6.83 years-$l,571.58 
7.67 x 6.75 years=$l,035.45 
7.67 x 6.75 years=$l,035.45 
7.67 x 6.667 years=$715.39 
7.67 x 6.667 years=$ 1,022.71 
7.67 x 6.583 years=$ 1,009.83 
7.67 x 6.583 years=$504.92 
7.67 x 6.583 years=$ 1,514.75 
7.67 x 6.5 years=$997.1 
7.67 x 6.416 years=$984.21 
7.67 x 6.416 years=$984.21 
7.67 x 6.416 years=$984.21 
7.67 x 6.416 years=$984.21 
7.34 x 5.416 years=$715.56 
7.34 x 5.334 years=$391.52 
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P46 $1,000 Dec. 31,2001 7.34 x 5.334 years=$391.52 
30. Based upon the foregoing, it is reasonable that judgment be entered for pre-judgment 
interest in the sum of $34,392.30. 
From the foregoing findings of fact, the Court now makes and enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Plaintiffs claim for unjust enrichment should be granted. 
2. The evidence supports the three required elements of an unjust enrichment claim, 
which are: 
A. The Defendant received a benefit from altering and forging the Plaintiffs 
checks. 
B. The Defendant had knowledge of the benefit he received. 
C. The Defendant committed misleading acts that would make it inequitable for 
him to retain the proceeds that he received from altering and forging the Plaintiffs checks. 
3. The Plaintiff is entitled to a $56,800 judgment against the Defendant, pre-judgment 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
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interest from the date of each check, if visible, and post-judgment interest at the legal rate. 
DATED this Zk ay of April, 2007. 
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JD21314170 
030902885 KIMBALL, J AMES L 
Thomas R. Blonquist, (0369) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
40 South Sixth East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Telephone: (801) 533-0525 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MERAE KIMBALL, 
v. 
JAMES L. KIMBALL, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. ] 
) JUDGMENT 
Case No. 030902885 
Judge Joseph C. Fratto, Jr. 
In this action, a bench trial was held and thereafter the court entered its findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, now, based thereupon, judgment is hereby entered against James L. Kimball, the 
above named Defendant. 
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the law, and by reason of the premises aforesaid, 
IT IS ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Plaintiff, Merae Kimball, recover 
from the Defendant, James L. Kimball, the sum of fifty-six thousand eight hundred dollars ($56,800) 
together with pre-judgment interest of thirty-four thousand three hundred ninety-two dollars and 
thirty cents ($34,392.30) and with said Plaintiffs costs in this action amounting to the sum of one 
tC* 
/*T'. 
3y. 
ENTERED IN REGISTRY 
OF JUDGMENTS 
DATE 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
APR 2,7 2007 
SALT LAK5 COUfC 
hundred sixty dollars ($160), for a total judgment of ninety-one thousand three hundred fifty-two 
dollars and thirty cents ($91,352.30), with interest thereon at the rate of 6.99% per annum from the 
date hereof until paid. 
Judgment rendered thisO ^day of April, 2007. 
Attest my hand as Clerk and the seal of the said Court this day of April, 2007. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MERAE KIMBALL, 
v. 
JAMES L. KIMBALL, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
AMENDED JUDGMENT 
Case No. 030902885 
Judge Joseph C. Fratto, Jr. 
In this action, a bench trial was held and thereafter the court entered its findings of fact and 
conclusions of law and a judgment. The Defendant filed a timely motion to alter or amend the 
judgment and the Court heard and considered arguments thereupon on August 6th, 2007. Following 
the hearing, the matter was taken under advisement and the Court, on August 20th, 2007 entered its 
memorandum decision denying the Defendant's motion with the exception of excluding the 
Plaintiffs Exhibits 45 and 46. Based upon the foregoing, the judgment entered in this cause on 
the 26th day of April, 2007 be and the same is amended as follows: 
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the law, and by reason of the premises aforesaid, 
IT IS ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Plaintiff, Merae Kimball, recover 
from the Defendant, James L. Kimball, the sum of fifty-four thousand eight hundred dollars 
($54,800) together with pre-judgment interest of thirty-three thousand six hundred nine dollars and 
twenty-six cents ($33,609.26) and with said Plaintiffs costs in this action amounting to the sum of 
one hundred sixty dollars ($160), for a total judgment of eighty-eight thousand five hundred sixty-
nine dollars and twenty-six cents ($88,569.26), with interest thereon at the rate of 6.99% per annum 
from the date hereof until paid. 
Judgment rendered this 1 7 day of September, 2007. 
Attest my hand as Clerk and the seal of the said Court this day of September, 2007. 
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The undersigned certifies that on the 31st day of August, 2007, a copy of the foregoing 
amended judgment was mailed, postage pre-paid, to Wendy Lems at 7650 South Union Park 
Center, Suite #350, Midvale, Utah 84047. 
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